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When, if ever, is there a Second Amendment right to kill a cop? This piece seeks 
to answer that question. In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Supreme Court held 
that the Second Amendment codifies a natural right to keep and bear arms for self-
defense. That right to self-defense extends to both private and public threats, 
including self-defense against agents of a tyrannical government. Moreover, the 
right is individual. Individuals―not just communities―have the right to protect 
themselves from public violence. Individuals―not just militias―have the right to 
defend themselves against tyranny. In McDonald v. City of Chicago, the Court 
went further, explaining that the right extends to state actors in large part due to 
the necessity that freedmen be able to defend themselves from tyrannical local law 
enforcement. 
But how is this right administered? If the Second Amendment protects an 
individual right to defend against tyranny, what does such a right look like? What 
does the Second Amendment say about retail forms of rebellion: threatening police 
officers, resisting an illegal arrest, cop killing? And how does it square with 
originalism, which rejects case-by-case balancing of government interests, and 
instead looks to history―a history that for centuries protected a right to violently 
resist unlawful arrest and which placed guns in the hands of freedmen specifically 
to challenge unreconstructed Southern law enforcement?  
These questions are especially pertinent now, as individuals bring handguns to 
town hall meetings and assault rifles to presidential addresses, and as the Court 
held in McDonald that the right extends to all levels of government and to all levels 
of law enforcement. 
As Justice Breyer remarked in his Heller dissent, “to raise a self-defense 
question is not to answer it.” This piece attempts to formulate answers to the 
questions that the Second Amendment raises and will continue to raise in the area 
of self-defense against the police. And it concludes that for the problem of retail 
rebellion there is a solution: retail justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Without a gun and a badge, what do you got? 
A sucker in a uniform waiting to get shot 
By me, or another nigga 
And with a gat it don’t matter if he’s smaller or bigger.1 
Rebellion is sold wholesale, but delivered retail. Broadsheets roar with peals of 
natural liberty and inalienable rights; speeches trumpet the bravery of patriots who 
rail against the forces of tyranny and oppression. But revolutionary acts are often 
brutal and pedestrian: a bullet shot into the body of law enforcement.2  
In District of Columbia v. Heller,3 the Supreme Court held that the Second 
Amendment preserves a right to keep and bear firearms for individual self-defense. 
In McDonald v. City of Chicago,4 the Court held that this right applies to state and 
local governments.5 That right may extend to forms of self-defense against the 
government—both federal and state. Portions of Heller seem giddy with 
revolutionary fervor: “[W]hen the able-bodied men of a nation are trained in arms 
and organized, they are better able to resist tyranny”;6 “‘the natural right of 
resistance and self-preservation’”7 is a right “protecting against both public and 
private violence.”8 Moreover, if Heller is taken at face value, the Second 
Amendment right of self-defense is primarily an individual right.9 Individuals―not 
just communities―have the right to protect themselves from government violence. 
Individuals―not just the militia―have the right to defend themselves against 
tyranny.10  
But Heller’s right of self-defense against tyranny suffers from a serious 
implementation problem.11 As Justice Breyer remarked in dissent, “to raise a self-
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. N.W.A., Fuck tha Police, on STRAIGHT OUTTA COMPTON (Ruthless Records 1988). 
Compare “God created men―Colonel [Sam] Colt made them equal,” an anonymous frontier 
saying. GARY KLECK, POINT BLANK: GUNS AND VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 156 (Aldine 
Transaction 2009) (1991). 
 2. “The bayonet, the butt of the rifle, the sabre, the pike, were in full play . . . . 
[Colonel Friedrich] Baum [was] shot through the body by a rifle ball, [and] fell mortally 
wounded . . . .” CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, REDCOATS AND REBELS: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
THROUGH BRITISH EYES 177 (W.W. Norton & Co., Inc. 2002) (1990) (internal citations and 
quotation marks omitted) (contemporary description of the death of a German officer 
fighting for the British during the Revolutionary War). 
 3. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 5. Id. at 3050. 
 6. Heller, 554 U.S. at 598. 
 7. Id. at 594 (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *136, *139). 
 8. Id. (emphasis added).  
 9. Id. at 594–95. 
 10. For a discussion of the potential Second Amendment rights of collectives, including 
corporations, see Darrell A.H. Miller, Guns, Inc.: Citizens United, McDonald, and the 
Future of Corporate Constitutional Rights, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011).  
 11. For another discussion of the implementation problem, see Darrell A.H. Miller, 
Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 
1313–59 (2009).  
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defense question is not to answer it.”12 “[T]he details”13 are what distinguish a 
successful doctrinal apparatus from an unsuccessful one.14 If the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to defend against tyranny, what does such 
a right look like? And how is it administered? How does it square with the 
originalist methodology insisted upon by the Heller majority? Specifically, what 
does the Second Amendment say about retail forms of rebellion: threatening police 
officers, resisting arrest, cop killing?15  
An anecdote crystallizes the problem: During the hot summer of 2009―as 
Americans brought their pistols to town-hall meetings16 and their assault rifles to 
presidential addresses17―the Second Amendment blogosphere crackled with 
indignation over a particular traffic stop in Shreveport, Louisiana.18 The story, as 
reported by a local news station, concerned a citizen who was pulled over by the 
police, asked about weapons in the vehicle, and then had his pistol and its 
ammunition seized and sequestered during the course of the stop.19 According to 
blog accounts, the stop was politically motivated, pretextual, and wholly 
unconstitutional.20 The story wouldn’t have garnered so much as a blurb in a news 
crawl, except that the citizen was so upset by the stop that he phoned the mayor’s 
office to complain and recorded the call.21 During the exchange, the mayor of 
Shreveport told the man that his Second Amendment rights were “suspended” 
during the stop.22  
This is the Second Amendment in miniature. Taking the reports as accurate, 
here we have a representative of the government (the officer) acting tyrannically 
(an unconstitutional search and seizure motivated by political animosity), and 
demanding surrender of the citizen’s firearm (disarmament). What is the citizen to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 13. Id.  
 14. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Foreword: 
Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L. REV. 54, 62 (1997) (“[S]ome constitutional 
norms may be too vague to serve directly as effective rules of law. . . . [I]n shaping 
constitutional tests, the Supreme Court must take account of empirical, predictive, and 
institutional considerations that may vary from time to time.”).  
 15. When I use the term retail rebellion, I mean individual or small-group acts of 
resistance to persons acting under color of law in response to or in anticipation of actual or 
perceived affronts to individual liberty or safety. The term is an allusion to retail as distinct 
from wholesale politics. 
 16. See Gail Collins, Gunning for Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2009, at A27. 
 17. Gun-Toting Protesters, Including One with Assault Weapon, Mill Outside Obama 
Speech in Arizona, NYDAILYNEWS.COM (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.nydailynews.com/ 
news/national/2009/08/18/2009-08-18_guntoting_protesters_including_one_with_assault_ 
weapon_mill_outside_obama_speech.html. 
 18. See Mayor Opposed to Guns and Civil Rights, NAGR GUN RIGHTS BLOG (June 25, 
2009), http://nationalgunrights.org/blog/?p=95. 
 19. Carolyn Roy, Traffic Stop Raises Gun Rights Question, Mayor Responds, KSLA 
NEWS (posted July 6, 2009; updated July 21, 2009), 
http://www.ksla.com/Global/story.asp?S=10652408. 
 20. See Mayor Opposed to Guns and Civil Rights, supra note 18. 
 21. Roy, supra note 19. 
 22. Id.  
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do? The citizen could surrender his weapon. But that puts him at the mercy of the 
government representative.23 He is now comparatively defenseless should the 
police offer unreasonable force. Plus, according to the most libertarian reading of 
the Second Amendment, the citizen has now capitulated to the very kind of 
violation the amendment was designed to prevent―disarmament of individual 
citizens by government agents.  
Alternatively, he could refuse to surrender his weapon. And if the police officer, 
as he is duty bound to do,24 pressed on with the stop, would the citizen have a 
Second Amendment right to escalate the confrontation? If the police officer raised 
his firearm to force compliance, did the citizen have a Second Amendment right to 
draw his own firearm in response? Did he have a right to fire on the officer to 
defeat this usurpation? Did others, upon seeing the confrontation, have a right to 
descend upon the scene with their own arms to thwart the arrest?25  
The problem appears scholastic,26 until one considers that the Court’s originalist 
methodology relies on history, and history gives retail rebellion some constitutional 
purchase. The Heller majority strove to adhere to a strict original public 
understanding methodology. That methodology attempts to fetter judicial discretion 
by forcing judges to imagine what the words of the Constitution would have meant 
to an ordinary person at the time they were ratified.27 In Heller, that interpretive 
mode required a technical and frequently paradoxical investigation into 
                                                                                                                 
 
 23. As the man stated, “I told [the mayor] that I was very uncomfortable standing on a 
busy street without my hand gun . . . .” Id.  
 24. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 897 F. Supp. 180, 183 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that 
law enforcement officers making an arrest were under no state-law obligation to retreat from 
an armed citizen); Fields v. Dailey, 587 N.E.2d 400, 406 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“When 
effecting a lawful arrest, a police officer is under no obligation to retreat. Rather, the officer 
is required to make arrests.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)); State v. Dunning, 98 S.E. 
530, 532 (N.C. 1919) (“The law does not require an officer with a warrant for an arrest for 
an offense to retreat or retire, but he must stand his ground and perform his duty . . . .” 
(quoting defendant’s prayers for instructions)); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607 (2006). 
 25. This scenario, resistance to an arrest perceived as biased or unlawful, has been the 
spark for more than one riot in American history. See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY 
COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 69–70, 93, 157–59 (1968) (Kerner Report) (discussing 
rioting in urban areas, and stating that “[a]lmost invariably the incident that ignites disorder 
arises from police action”). But resistance was also a well-accepted part of the common law 
at the time of the Founding. See infra Part II. 
 26. In fact, there has been at least one post-Heller case in which a defendant asserted a 
Second Amendment right to resist an unlawful arrest. People v. Srnec, No. 286528, 2010 
WL 292782, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2010). The Michigan court denied this defense 
with a terse one-sentence conclusion: “Defendant’s argument fails because the Second 
Amendment does not give any citizen a constitutional right to use deadly force to resist an 
unlawful arrest or seizure.” Id. 
 27. As Larry Solum observed, the term “originalism” is itself subject to dispute. See 
Lawrence B. Solum, Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
409, 411–16 (2009) (discussing debate over the meaning of originalism and offering a 
definition). My goal here is not to recapitulate these arguments, but to observe that the 
originalism articulated in Heller, whatever family of originalism it belongs to, appears to 
create principled but potentially untenable results. 
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seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nineteenth-century texts.28 Moreover, originalism 
disdains, and frequently derides, “balancing tests” that weigh constitutional 
commands against judicially idiosyncratic estimates of government interest.29 As 
Justice Scalia said in Heller, “[t]he very enumeration of the right takes out of the 
hands of government—even the Third Branch of Government—the power to 
decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth insisting upon.”30 
Instead, history is to be our guide.  
But at the time the people ratified the Second Amendment, violent, sometimes 
even deadly, resistance to an unlawful arrest had long been an established part of 
Anglo-American jurisprudence. In fact, according to some cases, even technical 
defects with an arrest could strip the law officer of his authority and leave him in 
no better position than a common assailant.  
Heller’s brand of originalism is made even more complicated by the Court’s 
plurality decision in McDonald v. City of Chicago.31 In McDonald, a majority of 
the Court held that the Second Amendment restrains states and localities to the 
exact same degree as the federal government.32 The right to keep and bear arms for 
self-defense is fundamental, a right “deeply rooted in [our] history and tradition.”33 
Among the McDonald Court’s reasons was a recognition that, during 
Reconstruction, local law enforcement was, in fact, behaving tyrannically.34 Local 
police and recusant state militias terrorized freedmen, sometimes alone, sometimes 
in collusion with unofficial citizen patrols and groups like the Klan.35 If one of the 
principal aims of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment was 
to allow freedmen to arm themselves in order to repel unreconstructed Southern 
law enforcement, then it seems that modern individuals would enjoy a 
constitutional right to publicly arm themselves in case they need to threaten, to 
resist, or even to fire upon police officers who violate the law. 
Far from a scholastic exercise, what is at stake is the constitutional sufficiency 
of most police-protecting laws and doctrines throughout the legal canon. Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence rests upon a web of assumptions that emphasize 
                                                                                                                 
 
 28. See Adam Winkler, Heller’s Catch-22, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1551, 1557–65 (2009) 
(exploring paradoxes and ironies in the Court’s application of originalism in Heller).  
 29. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008) (“We know of no other 
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding 
‘interest-balancing’ approach.”); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 579–80 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“[W]e should avoid wherever possible . . . a method of analysis that 
requires judicial assessment of the ‘importance’ of government interests . . . .”). 
 30. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (emphasis in original).  
 31. 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 32. Id. at 3050; see also id. at 3058–59 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
the judgment). On the narrow point of the applicability of the Second Amendment to the 
states, Justice Thomas concurred, making a majority. 
 33. Id. at 3036 (plurality opinion) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 
721 (1997)). 
 34. See id. at 3039–40 (discussing parties of Southern state militias disarming blacks); 
see also id. at 3059–60 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(discussing massacre of black militia members by white citizen militia). 
 35. See id. at 3039–40 (plurality opinion); see also id. at 3059–60 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
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protection of police from potentially armed individuals.36 Nearly two-thirds of the 
states criminalize resistance to even an unlawful arrest;37 others make it a crime to 
refuse to surrender a firearm during an investigatory stop;38 numerous jurisdictions 
treat the murder of a police officer as a crime deserving of especially severe 
punishment, including the death penalty.39 And yet, with Heller and McDonald the 
Court has seemingly collapsed the distinction between self-defense against 
criminals and self-defense against unconstitutional law enforcement. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 36. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973) (“The justification or reason 
for the authority to search incident to a lawful arrest rests quite as much on the need to 
disarm the suspect in order to take him into custody as it does on the need to preserve 
evidence on his person for later use at trial.”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) 
(establishing that protective stop-and-frisk is not a Fourth Amendment violation) (“[T]here 
must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the 
protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an 
armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the 
individual for a crime.”); see also Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 412–13 (1997) 
(holding that police may order passengers out of a vehicle in a traffic stop because of the 
danger to officers and citing criminological statistics on officer assaults during traffic stops). 
 37. ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.400(a)(1) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2508(A), 13-
404(B)(2) (2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-612 (2006); CAL. PENAL CODE § 834a (West 
2008); People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 35–36 (Cal. 1969); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-8-103 
(West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-23 (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 11, § 464(d) (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 776.051(1) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-
304(4)(a) (West 2008); State v. Richardson, 511 P.2d 263, 267 (Idaho 1973); 720 ILL. COMP. 
STAT. ANN. 5/7-7 (West 2002); Row v. Holt, 864 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (Ind. 2007); IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 804.12 (West 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3217 (2007); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 503.060(1) (LexisNexis 2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 17, § 108(1-A) (2006 & Supp. 2010); 
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 268, § 32B (LexisNexis 2002); People v. Ventura, 686 N.W.2d 748, 
752 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); State v. Sanders, 1991 Minn. App. LEXIS 84, *9 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 1991); MO. ANN. STAT. § 575.150 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-
7-301 (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-1409(2) (LexisNexis 2009); State v. Lisenbee, 13 
P.3d 947, 950–51 (Nev. 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:5 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 2C:3-4(b)(1)(a) (West 2005); OR. REV. STAT. § 161.260 (2009); State v. Tavarozzi, 446 
A.2d 1048, 1051 (R.I. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-11-5 (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-
16-602 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.03 (West 2003); American Fork City v. Pena-
Flores, 2002 UT 131, ¶¶ 6–7, 63 P.3d 675, 678–79 (Utah 2002); State v. Bradley, 10 P.3d 
358, 361–62 (Wash. 2000); State v. Hobson, 577 N.W.2d 825, 837 (Wis. 1998); see also 
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(a)(i). 
 38. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 1.13 (4th ed. 2004 & Supp.); cf. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-14-4 (West 2003) 
(requiring surrender of firearms at police officer’s request for any person occupying or using 
public property under the authority of a permit); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2923.163 (West 
2010) (discussing police right to request surrender of firearm and allowing for its return).  
 39. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(B) (2006) (authorizing the death penalty for an 
individual who “counsels, commands, induces, procures, or causes the intentional killing of 
any Federal, State, or local law enforcement officer engaged in, or on account of, the 
performance of such officer’s official duties”); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(3) (2006 & 
Supp. 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.2 (West 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (West 
2005). 
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Put bluntly, when, if ever, is there a constitutional right to kill a cop? The short 
answer is that there is a right, but it is not enforced in the broad and prospective 
manner in which constitutional rights are typically vindicated, or in the sense that 
the Court at times speaks of the right to self-defense. Instead, the problem of retail 
rebellion has a solution: retail justice. This Article, a companion to my previous 
work in this area,40 explores why.  
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the Court’s apparent codification of the 
natural right to self-defense in the Second Amendment and the logical problems it 
creates with respect to government actors.  
Part II connects retail rebellion to the common law right of self-defense against 
government agents, and especially common law self-defense in the form of 
resisting arrest.  
Part III discusses the history of retail rebellion in light of the realities of 
Reconstruction violence, especially as it pertains to police violence against 
freedmen.  
Part IV explores the complexities of Reconstruction violence and how the retail 
side to justice can implement the natural right of rebellion against government 
agents.  
I. THE PROBLEM OF RETAIL REBELLION 
Heller concerned a civil rights challenge to the District of Columbia’s severe 
restrictions on firearms within the District. Dick Anthony Heller, a federal judicial 
center special police officer, brought suit against the District and its agents under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the District’s regulations violated the Second 
Amendment.41 Among those unconstitutional requirements were that firearms be 
equipped with a trigger lock or be disassembled when in the owner’s house.42 After 
Heller lost in the district court43 and won in the court of appeals,44 the Supreme 
Court of the United States granted certiorari. Justice Scalia wrote for the five-
member majority and overturned the law, including the trigger lock requirement.45  
The majority opinion aspires to an unsullied application of original public 
understanding methodology. According to the majority, the Second Amendment’s 
text, “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed,”46 was understood 
by the people in 1791 to codify a preexisting right to keep arms for the “central 
component” of self-defense.47 This right to self-defense is a natural right, 
manifested in the English Bill of Rights and contained in the Second Amendment, 
but existing prior to them.48 The right is individual, unconnected with participation 
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. See Miller, supra note 11. 
 41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575–76 (2008). 
 42. Id. at 576.  
 43. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109–10 (D.D.C. 2004). 
 44. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 45. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635–36. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 47. Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–95. 
 48. See Michael Steven Green, Why Protect Private Arms Possession? Nine Theories of 
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in any official state militia or, in fact, any collective whatsoever.49 Also, the right to 
self-defense applies whether the source of confrontation is public or private.50 In 
this, the Court seems to tacitly concur with the view that  
[t]he Framers of the Constitution and the Second Amendment saw 
community defense against a criminal government as simply one end of 
a continuum that began with personal defense against a lone criminal; 
the theme was self-defense, and the question of how many criminals 
were involved (one, or a standing army) was merely a detail.51  
But details matter. And it is details that bedevil Heller.52 Of course, says the 
Court, there is no constitutional right to wage war.53 There is no right to a machine 
gun (no matter how effective such a weapon would be against government 
despots).54 There is no right to carry a gun into a school, police station, or 
courthouse.55 Presumably, one still can be prosecuted for refusing to surrender a 
firearm during a traffic stop, or for brandishing a weapon in front of a sheriff, or 
firing on a police officer making an arrest56―even an unconstitutional one. But 
Heller provides no clue as to why this should be, other than an unsatisfactory 
“because we say so.” 
With Heller, Justice Scalia created his own Brobdingnagian. From a distance, 
Heller is a colossus of principle, the most fully realized expression of originalist 
methodology in the canon, a “triumph.”57 Yet, examined closely, Heller, like 
Jonathan Swift’s race of giants, is marred by inconsistency and blemished by 
illogic. Its most unsightly wart is this wholly unreasoned caveat:  
                                                                                                                 
the Second Amendment, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 131, 136 (2008) (observing that Justice 
Scalia recognized a preexisting right to bear arms, a “natural right [that] would have limited 
the government’s authority even if the Founders had failed to recognize it in the 
Constitution”).  
 49. The Heller Court reaches this conclusion by holding that the portion of the 
amendment pertaining to the militia is merely “prefatory” to the latter, “operative,” portion 
of the amendment. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577–78. 
 50. Id. at 594. 
 51. David B. Kopel, The Second Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. 
REV. 1359, 1454 n.358; see Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of 
Self-Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 87, 93 (1992) [hereinafter Kates, Ideology] (“Whether 
murder, rape, and theft be committed by gangs of assassins, tyrannous officials and judges or 
pillaging soldiery was a mere detail . . . .”).  
 52. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 53. Id. at 586 (majority opinion).  
 54. See id. at 627. 
 55. See id. at 626–27 (regulations keeping arms out of “sensitive places” presumably 
constitutional). 
 56. The Court has defined an arrest as the application of physical force to restrain, 
however slight, and irrespective of its success, or submission by the arrestee to the authority 
of the officer. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624–25 (1991). 
 57. Winkler, supra note 28, at 1557 & n.30 (discussing academic and popular reactions 
to Heller); see Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment Minimalism: Heller as Griswold, 122 
HARV. L. REV. 246, 249 (2008) (“Heller is a thoroughly originalist opinion—a significant 
development, and one that is at least potentially important for the future, certainly of the 
Second Amendment, and perhaps more generally.”). 
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[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally 
ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such 
as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.58 
But for this thin line of ipse dixit, since reiterated in McDonald,59 the opinion’s 
sweeping natural law rhetoric pulses with anarchy. Heller and McDonald appear to 
suggest that the people ratified both the Second Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment with the understanding that they codify a previously natural, 
individual right to arm oneself in self-defense against government threats, and not 
only to arm oneself, but to use those arms in opposition to tyranny.  
As explained in Parts II and III, below, the Court’s methodology leads to 
unanticipated results when viewed in light of the history of self-defense against law 
enforcement during the Founding and Reconstruction. It could sanction individual 
acts of armed rebellion against a police officer whenever that officer exceeds his 
authority in a way that a person construes as despotic or tyrannical. It could be 
cited even to support efforts to cow, or even kill, law enforcement.60 I venture the 
Justices would blanch at this interpretation of the amendment. But squeamishness 
is not a reasoned rejection for its application, any more than the Court’s ipse dixit is 
a reasoned ground to hold that government can restrict sales of M-16s. What is 
needed is a theory that addresses these Second Amendment “details.”  
Part IV of this Article aims to supply at least a portion of such a theory. It 
explains how Reconstruction’s complexity, its gradual distrust of natural law 
arguments in favor of equality and process-based arguments, tames this retail 
rebellion problem in ways that are both manageable and in keeping with current 
doctrines on self-defense, but also potentially revolutionary in themselves.  
II. RETAIL REBELLION IN ACTION: THE LAW OF RESISTING ARREST 
N.W.A. snarled the lines of this Article’s epigraph in the 1980s. But the 
sentiment would have been familiar to the Framers of the Second Amendment. In 
the tradition of Anglo-American common law, a police officer acting without legal 
authority was nothing more than a common trespasser, a “sucker in a uniform,” and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 58. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. This passage has been particularly galling to those who 
seek a principled originalist doctrine of the Second Amendment. See Nelson Lund, The 
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1357–
58 (2009) (questioning the methodological source of these exceptions); J. Harvie Wilkinson 
III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 273 (2009) 
(noting that the Heller Court is not interested in dealing with the “unpleasant consequences” 
of the Second Amendment right to bear arms). 
 59. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3060 (2010) (plurality opinion). 
 60. The Court could simply decree, as it did in Heller, that the Second Amendment does 
not lead to these politically disfavored results. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. But doing so 
may open the Court to claims that it is engaging in naked power politics, not legal principle. 
See infra text accompanying notes 245–47.  
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could be resisted as such―by either the subject of the arrest alone or with the aid of 
others.61  
The same four generations of Englishmen that recognized the right to bear arms 
recognized the right of persons to use force to resist an illegal arrest.62 Initially, the 
theory was one of “provocation.”63 A person arrested illegally (or who witnessed 
such an illegal arrest) was “provoked” by the threat to liberty and had a right to 
respond with force.64 The right to resist an illegal arrest provided a complete 
defense to criminal liability when the person resisted with proportional nonlethal 
force.65 But even deadly force could be excused. A person who killed an officer 
could have the murder charge reduced to manslaughter,66 or even pardoned 
altogether, if he could show that he was resisting an illegal arrest. As the English 
common law developed in America, the understanding turned away from 
“provocation” theories and more to theories of self-defense.67 The following 
discussion tracks this history.  
As far back as the seventeenth century, jurists recognized a right to resist arrest. 
In 1666, for example, in Hopkin Huggett’s Case68 the judges of the King’s Bench 
considered that a man who killed an officer serving an imperfect government 
warrant could not be guilty of murder, but only manslaughter.69 John Berry and two 
other men were walking through London when they seized an unidentified man to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. See Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 
1129 (1969) (“An action by an official in excess of his authority was a trespass that could be 
resisted by physical force. The cases frequently treated the trespass as a ‘provocation,’ which 
would justify an assault, or, if the officer were killed, would reduce the crime from murder to 
manslaughter.”). For previous work on the history of resisting arrest, see id.; Craig 
Hemmens & Daniel Levin, “Not a Law at All”: A Call for a Return to the Common Law 
Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 29 SW. U. L. REV. 1 (1999); Andrew P. Wright, Resisting 
Unlawful Arrests: Inviting Anarchy or Protecting Individual Freedom?, 46 DRAKE L. REV. 
383 (1997). 
 62. According to Heller, the English codified a right to bear arms during the late Stuart 
age and continuing through the reign of Queen Anne. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592–93 
(discussing development of English right to bear arms). As discussed below, the English 
common law right to resist unlawful arrest developed in tandem to this right. 
 63. See Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 6.  
 64. Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 6; see also Chevigny, supra note 61, at 1129. 
 65. See People v. Dillard, 321 N.W.2d 757, 758 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (“The traditional 
common law rule has been that, short of killing the arresting officer, a person has the right to 
resist an unlawful arrest.” (citing Queen v. Tooley, (1709) 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B.); 2 Ld. 
Raym. 1296)); HARVEY CORTLANDT VOORHEES, The Law of Arrest, in CIVIL AND CRIMINAL 
ACTIONS § 86 (2d ed. 1915) (discussing the right to resist unlawful arrest with such force as 
is reasonably necessary to regain liberty). 
 66. See Chevigny, supra note 61, at 1129. 
 67. Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 6.  
 68. (1666) 84 Eng. Rep. 1082 (K.B.). 
 69. The opinion, after fashion of the time, is not clear either in its conclusion or the 
number of persons who subscribed to the opinion. It appears that in the lower court eight 
named judges believed the case to involve manslaughter and four believed it to involve 
murder, but that a majority upon certiorari to the King’s Bench thought it murder. See id. at 
1082–83.  
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impress into the King’s military.70 Huggett and three others overtook Berry and his 
companions, as well as the impressed man, and demanded to see their warrant.71 
Berry produced a paper “which Hopkin Huggett and the [three] others said was no 
warrant; and immediately . . . drew their swords to rescue” the impressed man.72  
During the ensuing fight, Huggett killed Berry.73 Eight of the judges initially 
stated that the death of Berry was not murder, for “if a man be unduly arrested or 
restrained of his liberty,” even if he offers no resistance himself, “yet this is a 
provocation to all other men of England, not only his friends but strangers also for 
common humanity sake.”74 It was thus no crime to try to rescue the victim of the 
unlawful arrest75 because each individual Englishman is appointed guardian of his 
fellows’ rights as Englishmen.76 Eventually, however, the same judges appear to 
have been convinced that it would be of 
dangerous consequence to give any encouragement to private men to 
take upon themselves to be the assertors of other men’s liberties . . . 
especially in a nation where good laws are for the punishment of all 
such injuries, and one great end of law is to right men by peaceable 
means, and to discountenance all endeavors to right themselves, much 
less other men, by force.77 
Despite the confused rationale of Hopkin Huggett’s Case, by 1709 the English 
courts had ensconced the common law right to resist an unlawful arrest and traced 
its roots to the fundamental laws of England.78 In Queen v. Tooley,79 Constable 
Samuel Bray arrested Anne Dekins for disorderly conduct, although this charge 
was found to be insufficient.80 A group of men, including Tooley, assaulted Bray 
with swords drawn.81 Bray “shewed his constable’s staff, and declared he was 
about the Queen’s business.”82 The group disbursed, only to return again with 
                                                                                                                 
 
 70. Id. at 1082. 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. The majority of the court concluded that it “ought appears to us” that Berry and 
his company did not have a warrant, but it is not clear whether the warrant was defective, or 
absolutely absent. Id.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id. 
 75. In modern law, an arrest can be unlawful if (a) executing an arrest under a facially 
defective warrant; (b) executing an arrest under a facially valid, but unlawfully issued, 
warrant; (c) executing an arrest without a warrant and without probable cause; or (d) 
executing an arrest that is otherwise lawful with excessive force. Penn Lerblance, Impeding 
Unlawful Arrest: A Question of Authority and Criminal Liability, 61 DENV. L.J. 655, 662–63 
(1983).  
 76. See Hopkin Huggett’s Case, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1082–83.  
 77. Id. at 1083.  
 78. Chevigny, supra note 61, at 1129–30. 
 79. (1709) 92 Eng. Rep. 349 (K.B.); 2 Ld. Raym. 1296. 
 80. Id. at 350. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
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drawn swords to where the constable was holding Dekins.83 The group demanded 
her release.84 Bray called for help from a fellow constable, and when that fellow 
arrived he was killed by the accused.85 The Queen’s Bench held that the defendants 
had not committed murder, but manslaughter only.86 They were apparently 
pardoned.87  
The defendants claimed that Bray had acted outside his jurisdiction and without 
a warrant.88 As such, they argued, “he did not act as a constable, but a common 
oppressor.”89 The defendants had been “provoked” to violence by the sight of such 
oppression, for “it is a sufficient provocation to all people out of compassion; much 
more where it is done under a colour of justice, and where the liberty of the subject 
is invaded, it is a provocation to all the subjects of England.”90 For, as the court 
concluded, if anyone “imprisons a man” against the law, “he is an offender against 
Magna Charta” and can be resisted as a tyrant.91 
Even technical defects in the arrest, a missing staple or a mistaken pen stroke, 
could dispel the law’s protection over an officer and transform him into a rogue. In 
Sir Henry Ferrers’s Case,92 an officer named Stone came to arrest Sir Henry 
Ferrers for a debt.93 Ferrers’s servant, seeking to rescue his master, killed the 
officer.94 The government indicted Ferrers on a charge of aiding and abetting in the 
murder.95 The court held that the warrant for Ferrers’s arrest was defective: the 
warrant said “Sir Henry Ferrers, Knight” when it should have said “Sir Henry 
Ferrers, Baronet.”96 This variance meant the servant’s killing of Stone could not be 
murder, because there was “no good warrant.”97 This formalist nicety remained 
persuasive to some courts even as late as the early nineteenth century. In Rex v. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 353. 
 87. Id. There is some ambiguity in the opinion as to what happened to the defendants 
after the court deemed them covered by a general Act of Pardon. Id.  
 88. Id. at 351. 
 89. Id. at 352.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. at 353; see also Rex v. Adey, (1779) 168 Eng. Rep. 205 (K.B.); 1 Leach 206. In 
Adey, a woman who killed an officer who came to arrest a man on an insufficient warrant 
was discharged after eighteen months. Id. at 208. The court speculated that if a man had 
killed officers who with insufficient warrant came to arrest him, “the homicide would have 
been lessened to the crime of manslaughter,” and acknowledged the precedent of Huggett 
and Tooley. Id. at 207.  
 92. (1634) 79 Eng. Rep. 924 (K.B.); Cro. Car. 371. 
 93. Id.  
 94. Id. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. But see Mackaley’s Case, (1611) 79 Eng. Rep. 239 (K.B.) 240; Cro. Jac. 279, 
280 (finding no defense on basis of error or mistake in process and sentencing the defendant 
to execution). Eventually, both English and American common law held that a technically 
defective warrant would not excuse resistance to an arrest. See R v. Davis, (1861) 169 Eng. 
Rep. 1305 (Carmarthen Assizes); Le. & Ca. 64.  
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Mead,98 the court acquitted a man of attempting to murder a bailiff while resisting 
arrest because the bailiff could only produce the arrest warrant, but not the 
underlying writ.99 As such the bailiff “must be considered as a trespasser.”100  
The English common law right to resist an illegal arrest persisted in American 
jurisprudence for nearly two hundred years after independence, eventually taking 
on a more explicit self-defense cast. In the Massachusetts case Commonwealth v. 
Drew,101 Drew killed a deputy sheriff attempting to arrest him in his place of 
work.102 Drew cited in his defense Sir Henry Ferrers’s Case, Hopkin Huggett’s 
Case, and Tooley, among other English precedents, alleging among other factors 
that the deputy did not have legal authority to effect the arrest.103 The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts concurred that “if any man, under color or claim of 
legal authority, unlawfully arrest, or actually attempt or offer to arrest another, and 
if he resist [and kill] the aggressor, it will be manslaughter” and that any person 
coming to the aid of such a person would also be guilty only of manslaughter.104 
The jury, based on this instruction, acquitted Drew of murdering an officer in 
execution of his office, but, paradoxically, found him guilty of murdering Drew as 
an ordinary citizen.105 
Later, that same court granted a new trial to a group of citizens who repelled 
officers attempting an arrest without a good warrant. In Commonwealth v. 
Crotty,106 officers attempted to arrest Crotty on a general warrant.107 Crotty 
resisted, and his fellow defendants came to his aid.108 The entire group was charged 
with riot.109 Because the warrant was defective, the officer “acted without warrant 
and was a trespasser.”110 The court concluded that the alleged rioters in resisting the 
officer “were guilty of no improper or excessive force or violence” and could not 
be guilty of riot.111  
                                                                                                                 
 
 98. (1817) 171 Eng. Rep. 621 (K.B.); 2 Stark. 205. The prosecution claimed that “it was 
the duty of a party . . . to submit himself [to arrest] in the first instance” and only afterwards 
to “obtain redress by means of a civil action” if the arrest was not lawful. Id. at 622. The 
prisoners were acquitted. Id.  
 99. Another feature of the case might have been defects in the scope of the jurisdiction 
granted by the writ. See id. at 622.  
 100. Id.; see also Chevigny, supra note 61, at 1129–31 (discussing unlawful arrest as 
sufficient provocation).  
 101. 4 Mass. (4 Tyng) 391 (1808).  
 102. Id. at 392–94. 
 103. Id. at 394.  
 104. Id. at 397–98.  
 105. See id. at 391, 398.  
 106. 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 403 (1865).  
 107. See id. at 403. The warrant did not name Crotty, but used the term “John Doe” or 
“Richard Roe.” Id. The arresting officers said they did not rely upon the warrant, but upon 
other information. Id. 
 108. Id.  
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 405.  
 111. Id. 
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Threatening an officer with arms could be excused, if the officer acted without 
proper authority. In United States v. Goure,112 a defendant, John Goure, was 
convicted for “with force and arms . . . threaten[ing] to kill” two constables who 
attempted to arrest him illegally.113 The constables had acted upon an information, 
but without a warrant.114 The court held that Goure must be released.115 Although 
the United States had charged that Goure had “intend[ed] to intimidate” the 
officers, because they were not acting upon a good warrant, Goure could not have 
committed a crime,116 and was within his rights to resist them. 
Half a century later, American courts could still exonerate a person for resisting 
an unlawful arrest. In 1900, in Bad Elk v. United States,117 the United States 
Supreme Court granted another trial for a man sentenced to death for killing a 
police officer while resisting arrest.118 The Court, after reciting the long history of 
the common law right to resist an illegal arrest, concluded: 
[T]he law looks with very different eyes upon the transaction, when the 
officer had the right to make the arrest, from what it does if the officer 
had no such right. What might be murder in the first case might be 
nothing more than manslaughter in the other, or the facts might show 
that no offence had been committed.119  
State courts throughout the nation concurred with this understanding. Many 
came to shift focus from provocation to the self-defense origins of the right to resist 
arrest.120 Some states went so far as to permit deadly force to resist an illegal arrest, 
even if the only threat to the individual was loss of liberty, rather than loss of 
life.121 However, no Supreme Court decision has ever held that the right to defend 
                                                                                                                 
 
 112. 25 F. Cas. 1381 (C.C.D.C. 1834) (No. 15,240).  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id.  
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. 177 U.S. 529 (1900).  
 118. Id. at 530, 538. 
 119. Id. at 537–38. 
 120. See, e.g., State v. Oliver, 7 Del. (2 Houst.) 585, 604–06, 608 (Del. Super. Ct. 1863); 
Perdue v. State, 63 S.E. 922, 923–25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1909); Simmerman v. State, 17 N.W. 
115, 116–17 (Neb. 1883); see also Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 6. Hemmens and 
Levin suggest that the courts began to switch emphasis from a provocation rationale to a 
self-defense rationale in the early twentieth century. Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 6. 
It is not apparent that this distinction would have been recognized in the eighteenth century, 
nor is it apparent that the rationale, whether couched as self-defense to an officer’s assault or 
as provoked resistance to a perceived usurpation, makes much difference in terms of whether 
the person has a right to resist.  
 121. See State v. Bethune, 99 S.E. 753, 754 (S.C. 1919) (upholding “[t]he right of a 
person to resist an unlawful arrest, even to the extent of taking the life of the aggressor, if it 
be necessary, in order to regain his liberty”); see also Perdue, 63 S.E. at 924 (“We do not 
think that a person would have a right to kill an officer who attempted to commit a trespass 
upon his person and nothing more. The degree of force used to resist an illegal arrest would 
depend upon that used or attempted by the officer; and where a person resists an officer 
attempting to arrest him without legal authority, and the resistance is only proportionate to 
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against an unlawful arrest is a constitutional as opposed to a mere common law 
right.122 Whether Heller and McDonald changed that is the crux of this Article.  
The common law right to resist an illegal arrest, as a species of self-defense, 
went into steep decline in the latter half of the twentieth century. The decline began 
in the 1950s and 1960s, with the drafting of the Uniform Arrest Act and the Model 
Penal Code.123 Today, only thirteen states allow a person to resist an illegal 
arrest.124 The modern trend is to forbid resistance to an arrest, “which the arrestee 
knows is being made by a peace officer, even though the arrest is unlawful.”125 
Even in those jurisdictions with a right to resist arrest, almost none of them allow 
resistance to a Terry-style stop-and-frisk,126 even though courts rely on “policy 
arguments used elsewhere to support abolition of the common law [right to resist 
arrest] itself.”127  
                                                                                                                 
the assault, and is provoked by it, and the killing is without malice, it is neither murder nor 
manslaughter.”); Simmerman, 17 N.W. at 117 (“‘[W]here A. unlawfully attempts to arrest 
B., B. is justified in resisting; and if A. so presses B. as to make it necessary for him to 
choose between submission and killing A., then the killing A. is not even manslaughter.’” 
(quoting FRANCIS WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HOMICIDE IN THE UNITED STATES 
§ 227 (2d ed. 1875))). 
 122. The closest the Court has come has been in dicta and in dissent. See United States v. 
Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948) (“One has an undoubted right to resist an unlawful arrest, 
and courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases.”); see also Wainwright v. City 
of New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 613 (1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting from dismissal of 
certiorari as improvidently granted) (“[T]he principle that a citizen can defy an 
unconstitutional act is deep in our system.”). The distinction is important as the common law 
may be abrogated by statute or overturned by later decision, whereas a constitutional right 
cannot be directly altered except through the amendment process.  
 123. See Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 18–24.  
 124. Those states are Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, 
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia and 
Wyoming. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-28 (LexisNexis 2005); Ex parte Wallace, 497 So. 2d 96, 97 
(Ala. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24 (2007); Long v. State, 583 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:108 (2004 & Supp. 2010); State v. Ceaser, 2002-3021 
(La. 10/21/03); 859 So. 2d 639, 643; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-408(b) (LexisNexis 
2002 & Supp. 2010); Lamb v. State, 786 A.2d 783, 800–01 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); 
Chambers v. State, 973 So. 2d 266, 271 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007); State v. Phillips, 203 P.3d 
146, 149–50 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); People v. Jensen, 654 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (N.Y. 1995); 
Commonwealth v. Jackson, 924 A.2d 618, 620 (Pa. 2007); State v. McGowan, 557 S.E.2d 
657, 661 (S.C. 2001); Messier v. Commonwealth, No. 1956-06-2, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS 
201, *2 (Va. Ct. App. May 15, 2007); State v. Mullins, 62 S.E.2d 562, 564–65 (W. Va. 
1950); Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1995); Van Horn v. State, 802 P.2d 
883, 885 (Wyo. 1990). Two states’ laws, Ohio and Vermont, are ambiguous. OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 2921.33 (LexisNexis 2010); City of Columbus v. Fraley, 324 N.E.2d 736, 
739–40 (Ohio 1975); State v. Durham, 2007-Ohio-6262, at ¶ 12 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3017 (2009); State v. Peters, 450 A.2d 332, 333–35 (Vt. 1982). 
 125. Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Right to Resist Excessive Force in Accomplishing 
Lawful Arrest, 77 A.L.R.3d 281 § 2[b] (1977).  
 126. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30–31 (1968) (establishing the lawfulness of the stop-
and-frisk).  
 127. LAFAVE, supra note 38; see also United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1431 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (“[A] defendant’s response to even an invalid arrest or Terry stop may constitute 
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The only universal exception is that a person may resist an officer who uses 
such excessive force as to threaten immediate death or injury. But even then, the 
person is obliged to defuse the confrontation. Where the police officer is using 
excessive force―as, for example, holding someone at gunpoint for a parking 
ticket―the individual must submit to the arrest if he knows, or has reason to know, 
that by submitting the police officer will relent in his excessive use of force.128 
Courts and commentators offer a number of process- and law-and-order-based 
justifications to abrogate the common law right to resist arrest.129 Whereas at one 
time arrest could lead to indefinite detention in squalid conditions, today, effective 
post-arrest remedies and more humane terms of confinement have rendered the 
necessity of resisting arrest dangerously anachronistic.130 Courts frequently pair 
these arrestee-focused justifications with the specter of violence and chaos 
threatened by self-help,131 especially in an era of heavily armed law enforcement.132  
                                                                                                                 
independent grounds for arrest.”); Hicks v. State, 984 A.2d 246, 253 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 
2009) (“There is no privilege to resist either an unlawful Terry stop, or an unlawful frisk.” 
(citation omitted)). The Supreme Court of Louisiana, which does allow resistance to an 
unlawful arrest, distinguished resistance to a stop-and-frisk this way:  
Extending the rule that a citizen may resist an unlawful arrest to an unlawful 
stop-and-frisk would belie the paramount purpose of ensuring officer safety by 
encouraging the use of force on police officers. Law enforcement officials are 
called upon in the field to make split-second decisions regarding their own 
safety, and whether the officer did, in hindsight, possess articulable suspicion to 
justify the frisk should be resolved in the courtroom rather than in the streets. 
State v. Sims, 2002-2208, p. 11 (La. 6/27/03); 851 So. 2d 1039, 1046–47.  
 128. Ytreberg, supra note 125, § 8.  
 129. See Wright, supra note 61, at 389–401, for one summary of such reasons.  
 130. See, e.g., People v. Hess, 687 P.2d 443, 446–47 (Colo. 1984) (remarking on the 
improved post-arrest remedies available to a defendant); Ellison v. State, 410 A.2d 519, 525 
(Del. Super. Ct. 1979) (“Where society has provided its members with a reasonable means to 
obtain prompt and impartial review of their legal disputes, the necessity for resort to self-
help remedies is radically dissipated and society need no longer tolerate such efforts.”); State 
v. Richardson, 511 P.2d 263, 267 (Idaho 1973) (resisting arrest is “clearly not favored in this 
modern era where a defendant has the protections and benefits of liberal bonding policies, 
appointed counsel[,] . . . and the opportunity to be taken before a magistrate for immediate 
arraignment and preliminary hearing”); Commonwealth v. Moreira, 447 N.E.2d 1224, 1227 
(Mass. 1983) (noting that liberal bail, right to counsel, right to remain silent, right to cut off 
interrogation, and speedy arraignment and trial all justify abrogation of the common law 
right to resist illegal arrest); American Fork City v. Pena-Flores, 2002 UT 131, ¶¶ 13, 15, 63 
P.3d 675, 679 (noting increased availability or procedural protections); State v. Hobson, 577 
N.W.2d 825, 834–36 (Wis. 1998) (noting similar reasons); Sam B. Warner, The Uniform 
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 315 (1942) (noting conditions of jails and paucity of 
procedural protections).  
 131. See, e.g., Miller v. State, 462 P.2d 421, 426 (Alaska 1969) (noting danger of 
escalation of violence when a citizen resists arrest); State v. Mitchell, 62 P.3d 616, 619 
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (“The purpose of the resisting arrest statute is to protect peace officers 
and citizens from substantial risk of physical injury.”); People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36 
(Cal. 1969) (noting resistance to armed police heightens potential for violence); People v. 
Villarreal, 604 N.E.2d 923, 929 (Ill. 1992) (noting that self-help would “create havoc, and 
substantially hinder our police forces’ ability to keep the peace”); Sam Bass Warner, 
Investigating the Law of Arrest, 26 A.B.A. J. 151, 154 (1940) (observing that because of 
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Finally, courts have suggested that Fourth Amendment protections have 
obviated the need for self-help. Doctrinal rules such as the exclusionary rule, the 
prohibition on deadly force to arrest a fleeing suspect, and damage actions for 
illegal arrest under § 1983 have undermined the urgency of resort to self-defense or 
the defense of others to retain liberty.133  
All of these reasons to abrogate the right to resist arrest seem sensible. But 
modern changes in the law, no matter how sensible, cannot contravene 
constitutional commands. As Paul Chevigny observed half a century ago, “[t]he 
right to resist unlawful arrest memorializes one of the principal elements in the 
heritage of the English revolution: the belief that the will to resist arbitrary 
authority in a reasonable way is valuable and ought not to be suppressed by the 
criminal law.”134 Both the right to resist arrest and the right to keep and bear arms 
for self-defense are products of our English common law traditions.135 If the 
common law right of self-defense is now a constitutional imperative, and if 
resisting arrest (not to mention lesser defensive activity, such as carrying a weapon 
into a tax assessor’s office) is merely self-defense against specific government 
threats to liberty, then it cannot be abrogated by common law decision making or 
legislation, no matter how much it makes good policy. As the Court has insisted, 
the enumeration of a right “takes certain policy choices off the table.”136 And if 
Americans understood themselves to have a constitutionally guaranteed right to 
defend themselves and others against illegal arrest in 1791, then the gradual decline 
and abolition of the right in the subsequent two centuries should be 
inconsequential, however justifiable.137 That all the whelks and pimples of 
                                                                                                                 
firearms “the right to resist by force an illegal arrest . . . is a right which is calculated, if 
exercised under modern conditions, to increase rather than alleviate the mass of human 
suffering”).  
 132. Curtis, 450 P.2d at 36 (noting better armament of police). For discussions of the 
militarization of law enforcement, see David B. Kopel & Paul M. Blackman, Can Soldiers 
Be Peace Officers?: The Waco Disaster and the Militarization of American Law 
Enforcement, 30 AKRON L. REV. 619 (1997); Karan R. Singh, Note, Treading the Thin Blue 
Line: Military Special-Operations Trained Police SWAT Teams and the Constitution, 9 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 673 (2001).  
   133.  See Hobson, 577 N.W.2d at 836 (noting availability of exclusionary rule and damage 
actions in lieu of armed resistance); see also Moreira, 447 N.E.2d at 1227 (noting that 
procedural protections have made right to resist unlawful arrest “anachronistic”).  
 134. Chevigny, supra note 61, at 1137.  
 135. Compare id. with District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592–93 (2008) 
(discussing the rights of the English under the Declaration of Right).  
 136. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3050 (2010) (quoting Heller, 554 
U.S. at 636).  
 137. Paul Chevigny speculated that “the right to resist may be viewed as a common law 
right as well as a constitutional right.” Chevigny, supra note 61, at 1139. Given that the 
Court has constitutionalized other common law doctrines in the Fourth Amendment, Fifth 
Amendment, and Sixth Amendment contexts, it seems plausible that Heller could do 
something similar with the Second Amendment. Cf. David A. Sklansky, The Fourth 
Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1739, 1808 (2000) (describing Justice 
Scalia’s Fourth Amendment originalism as “constitutionalized common law”); id. at 1757 
(describing Justice Scalia as proposing “that eighteenth-century common law should be the 
measure of Fourth Amendment protection”).  
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eighteenth-century formalism encrust the right to self-defense is simply the price 
paid for constitutional principle.138  
Moreover, states have abrogated the common law right to resist arrest on policy 
grounds specifically counter-indicated by both Heller and McDonald. Take, for 
instance, the argument that it is futile and dangerous to resist a heavily armed 
policeman.139 The California Supreme Court made the point this way: “In a day 
when police are armed with lethal and chemical weapons, and possess scientific 
communication and detection devices readily available for use, [it is] highly 
unlikely that a suspect, using reasonable force, can escape from or effectively deter 
an arrest.”140 But the Heller Court specifically rejected this type of argument from 
futility. Supporters of the District argued that the Second Amendment right could 
not be individual because employing small arms against a standing army equipped 
with “modern-day bombers and tanks” would be well-nigh useless.141 The Court 
breezily dismissed that point, stating that the individual right had not lapsed simply 
because the “fit” between the right and its actual effectiveness had loosened in the 
past two centuries.142  
Similarly, states have abolished the right to resist arrest because police and 
jailors are better trained and because the incarcerated enjoy numerous levels of 
procedural protections. But the Court shot down a similar argument in Heller. Even 
if the modern standing army were more reliable, “the pride of our Nation,” rather 
than a threat, and even if the police were “well-trained” and provided “personal 
security,” even then it was not for the Court to render the Second Amendment 
“extinct.”143 The Court did not think these changed circumstances had any bearing 
on the Second Amendment’s effect on self-defense against the military; why should 
they have any bearing on the right to self-defense against the police? Moreover, in 
McDonald, the Court specifically identified the ill-treatment of freedmen by local 
law enforcement as the reason the right is incorporated against the states.144 
                                                                                                                 
 
 138. On the challenge that public-understanding originalism need not consider the 
formalism of its source material, see ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 
(1997) (“The rule of law is about form.” (emphasis in original)); Stephanos Bibas, 
Originalism and Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the 
Unlikely Friend of Criminal Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183, 199 (2005) (“Where the text and 
historical record disclose a bright-line rule, the originalist approach leads one to a formalistic 
rule.”); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 122 
(2006) (“[S]ome originalists have argued that the provisions [incorporating common law 
principles] must be understood according to common law rules that prevailed when the 
Constitution was adopted.”); see also Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 95 (1998) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (interpreting the Fourth Amendment text in light of “the common law 
background against which it was adopted”). 
 139. People v. Curtis, 450 P.2d 33, 36 (Cal. 1969). 
 140. Id. (emphasis in original). But see McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3045 (refusing to 
construe the Second Amendment right differently than other constitutional rights due to its 
public safety implications).  
 141. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 (2008). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. at 636.  
 144. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3037–42; see also infra text accompanying notes 156–241.  
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This methodological support for strong protection of retail rebellion is 
strengthened by the Court’s occasionally reflexive incorporation of natural law 
philosophy.145 Second Amendment crusaders often advance the proposition that the 
natural right of self-defense is preeminent among all other rights.146 Not only is the 
right preeminent, but inalienable. Frequently, the rhetoric contains heady libertarian 
strains:  
[T]he Founding Fathers and the natural-rights philosophers they 
followed (Hobbes, Locke, Blackstone, and Montesquieu, among others) 
enthusiastically embraced the right of personal self-defense. It bears 
emphasis that self-defense had a broader meaning than it is usually 
conceived of having today. Self-defense included not only defense 
against apolitical crime but also against assassination, genocide, and 
other politically-motivated oppressions—what Algernon Sidney called 
“the violence of a wicked magistrate who, ha[ving] armed a crew of 
lewd villains,” subjects the people to murder, pillage, and rape.147  
Hobbes went so far as to argue that the natural law of self-preservation requires 
an individual to resist arrest, even if the arrest was wholly lawful.148 The individual 
encounter between the sovereign (in the form of the officer) and the accused 
presented what Alice Ristroph has identified as the “specific state of nature.”149 The 
“specific state of nature” is nothing more than a “conflict between two mere 
mortals in the state of nature [where] both the sovereign and the criminal . . . have 
equal rights of self-preservation, and the criminal has as much right to resist 
punishment as the sovereign has to impose it.”150 This right to resist is an 
inalienable natural right. As Ristroph writes, “[s]ince ‘a man cannot lay down the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 145. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 (calling self-defense a “basic” right); Heller, 
554 U.S. at 595 (“Americans understood the ‘right of self-preservation’ as permitting a 
citizen to ‘repe[l] force by force’ when ‘the intervention of [the] society in his behalf, may 
be too late to prevent an injury.’” (first alteration in original, second alteration added) 
(quoting 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES 145 n.42 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803))).  
 146. See, e.g., Stephen P. Halbrook, The Right of Workers to Assemble and to Bear Arms: 
Presser v. Illinois, One of the Last Holdouts Against Application of the Bill of Rights to the 
States, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 943, 950 (1999) (discussing common law recognition of 
use of deadly force against a law officer’s excessive force); Kates, Ideology, supra note 51, 
at 101 (noting that the founders thought that “every free man has an inalienable right to 
defend himself against robbery and murder—or enslavement, which partakes of both,” 
including a right to defend himself against tyranny); see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036 
(calling self-defense the “central component” of the Second Amendment right (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 599)).  
 147. Don B. Kates & Clayton E. Cramer, Second Amendment Limitations and 
Criminological Considerations, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1339, 1345 (2009) (first alteration added, 
second alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES 
CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 246 (1805)). For an account of such behavior, see infra Part III 
(discussing police violence during Reconstruction).  
 148. See Alice Ristroph, Respect and Resistance in Punishment Theory, 97 CALIF. L. 
REV. 601, 615–18 (2009).  
   149.    Id. at 614. 
 150. Id. at 615.  
958 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:939 
 
right of resisting them, that assault him by force,’ no one can be understood to have 
abandoned or transferred the right to resist ‘wounds, chains, and imprisonment.’”151  
The Heller and McDonald Courts do not state that resisting arrest is a natural 
right; but neither do they make any meaningful distinction between the natural right 
of self-preservation when the attacker is a criminal as opposed to a police officer, 
nor does the Court’s appeal to eighteenth-century history and natural law help to 
craft such a distinction. Instead, the theoretical basis of abrogating the right to resist 
an illegal arrest seems to “reflect[] a shifting preference . . . for order over 
liberty.”152 But, as the Court has suggested more than once, those preferences were 
already fixed at the Founding, so any shift should be irrelevant. Further, abrogation 
of the right to resist such an assault to liberty would seem to “criminalize[] the 
natural defensive human reaction”153 the Second Amendment is supposed to 
protect.154  
The Heller methodology, perhaps unwittingly, incorporates a formalist and 
natural law history of self-defense that is alien to most modern understandings of 
law enforcement. But, if self-defense against police in 1791 included these formal 
and natural law elements, then they should form a part of the original public 
understanding of what the Constitution protects today in individual encounters with 
the police. And yet little of the existing scholarship actually addresses the 
consequences of this methodology. Instead, the literature tends to resort to 
glittering generalities that some kind of lawful right to resist arrest exists, but does 
not adequately explain from whence it comes, or the nature of its limitations.155  
Further, as Part III explores, this eighteenth-century problem of retail rebellion 
is magnified by congressional debates concerning the arming of freedmen during 
Reconstruction.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. Id. at 617 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 93 (Richard Tuck ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 1991) (1651) (spelling, punctuation, and capitalization modernized)). A slightly 
different version of this idea appears in Green’s concept of “state-of-nature pockets,” areas 
in which “we are released from the authority of the government when faced with imminent 
violence” and the government cannot—or will not—assist. Green, supra note 48, at 170.  
 152. Hemmens & Levin, supra note 61, at 3.  
 153. Lerblance, supra note 75, at 682. Nicholas Johnson put it this way: “In its immediate 
and most essential form, self-defense is not something government really can stop. If a 
psychopath kicks down my door, nothing anyone in Washington can say or do will keep me 
from going at him with something heavy or sharp.” Nicholas J. Johnson, Self-Defense?, 2 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 187, 194 (2006). 
 154. For more on self-defense as a constitutional guarantee, see Johnson, supra note 153. 
 155. See, e.g., Halbrook, supra note 146, at 950 (remarking on the common law right to 
use deadly force to resist police threatening excessive force); Kates, Ideology, supra note 51, 
at 93 (noting philosophical antecedents of the right to resist “tyran[n]ical officials”); Kopel, 
supra note 51, at 1454 n.358 (discussing self-defense as a continuum—from an individual’s 
right to protect himself against a criminal individual to an individual’s right to protect 
himself against a criminal government).  
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III. RETAIL REBELLION REPRISE: SOUTHERN RECONSTRUCTION 
Heller’s retail rebellion problem is compounded by a brute fact: there is such a 
thing as lawless law enforcement.156 The professional police force is of recent 
vintage.157 Early law enforcement was “a community affair,”158 with a rotating 
detail of night watchmen raising a “hue and cry” in case of trouble, to which every 
adult male was required to respond.159 Well into the nineteenth century, law 
enforcement continued as a patchwork of hired retainers, private collectives, 
community regulators, militia members, and detachments of military officials.160 
Unfortunately, for much of this period, law enforcement was poorly paid (if paid at 
all), corrupt, and inept.161 To the Founding generation, “[g]enerally . . . there was 
no difference in character among rioters, felons and soldiers,”162 and, one might 
add, police.  
Lawless law enforcement persisted into the nineteenth century. America’s 
experience with Reconstruction was proof. In fact, the development of the 
professional urban police department coincided with the turmoil of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction. As the McDonald Court observed, during the nineteenth 
century, freedmen and Union sympathizers had as much to fear from Southern law 
enforcement as they did from terrorist organizations like the Klan.163 Often, it was 
difficult to distinguish between the two. To paraphrase a colleague: sometimes the 
sheriff wore a badge, sometimes he wore a sheet.164 Prior to the passage of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, but contemporaneously with its model, the Civil Rights 
Act of 1866, police departments on at least three occasions joined with white 
rioters to disarm, assault, and kill freedmen, Union sympathizers, and black federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. The United States Department of Justice compiles statistics of police misconduct. 
During 2002, citizens filed over 25,000 complaints of use of force; of these, approximately 
eight percent were meritorious. See MATTHEW J. HICKMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SPECIAL REPORT: CITIZEN COMPLAINTS ABOUT USE OF FORCE 1 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/ccpuf.pdf.  
 157. For a general survey of the history of the police, see David A. Sklansky, The Private 
Police, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1165 (1999) [hereinafter Sklansky, Private Police]. See also 
Kates, Ideology, supra note 51, at 92 (“The notion that the truly civilized person eschews 
self-defense . . . would never have occurred to the Founders since there were no police in 
eighteenth century America and England.”).  
 158. Sklansky, Private Police, supra note 157, at 1197 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 159. Id. 
 160. See HARLAN HAHN & JUDSON L. JEFFRIES, URBAN AMERICA AND ITS POLICE 3–4 
(2003); Sklansky, Private Police, supra note 157, at 1197–98. 
 161. Jerome Hall, Legal and Social Aspects of Arrest Without a Warrant, 49 HARV. L. 
REV. 566, 580–82 (1936) (noting the prevalence of bribery in early law enforcement); 
Sklansky, Private Police, supra note 157, at 1198–1200.  
 162. Kates, Ideology, supra note 51, at 99. 
 163. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038–42 & n.20 (2010); see also id. 
at 3081–83 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result).  
 164. Thanks to Chris Bryant for this pithy remark. See also id. at 3039 (majority opinion) 
(describing a town marshal in the South who took arms from freedmen and summarily shot 
them).  
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troops.165 In fact, from one perspective, congressional protections of freedmen’s 
rights to arms could be read to facilitate just the type of armed standoff that the 
Shreveport, Louisiana hypothetical suggests.  
But as Part IV argues, those who extrapolate from Reconstruction an unqualified 
vindication of freedmen’s inalienable right to self-defense obscure a far, far more 
nuanced and fractious history. Reconstruction was a quagmire. Brittle antebellum 
assumptions that had unified Americans on issues of natural rights, self-defense, 
common law, federalism, and the police power broke open and swallowed the 
nation in the confused post-War reality. Reconstruction was a slough of conflicting 
motivations and justifications, where police and law enforcement were variously 
characterized as despots, racist thugs, preservers of the peace, or anti-tyranny 
crusaders, depending on one’s political sympathies. To simplify this narrative into 
the unalloyed vindication of self-protection is shallow and tendentious.  
The post-War South jangled with paranoia and rumor.166 Children playing with 
wooden swords became seeds for fantastic stories of incipient campaigns of black 
vengeance.167 White Southerners harangued the Freedmen’s Bureau and federal 
troops to disarm the freedmen.168 When they did not respond, white citizens 
mobilized themselves into informal “citizen patrols,” a “people’s militia”169 to 
defend against phantom armies of freedmen marauders.170  
Unhappy with informal efforts, Southerners petitioned for the national 
government to restore the official state militia to enforce the law.171 Although 
federal authorities throughout the South strongly opposed the reorganization of the 
state militias,172 the Southern provisional governments prevailed. Southern militias 
re-formed with the authority “to apprehend criminals, suppress crime, and protect 
the inhabitants.”173 As opponents predicted, the first post-War militias were nothing 
more than ex-Confederates with a badge.174 They were thugs in uniform, engaged 
in a campaign of terror “aimed directly at Negroes who displayed a tendency to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 165. See infra text accompanying notes 179–234; see also McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3087 
(noting that private violence, “often with the assistance of local governments,” helped 
subjugate the freedmen).  
 166. GEORGE C. RABLE, BUT THERE WAS NO PEACE: THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE 
POLITICS OF RECONSTRUCTION 26 (2007). For much of the history of this period I am 
indebted to Rable’s book and research. 
 167. Id.  
 168. Id. at 27. 
 169. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599–600 (2008). 
 170. RABLE, supra note 166, at 27. The retail problems with this idea of the “people’s 
militia” during Reconstruction are hard to overstate. No doubt the Framers of the Second 
Amendment accepted the idea of a nascent people’s or citizens’ militia designed to protect 
against tyrannical government. But when that people’s militia was actually mobilized during 
Reconstruction, it simply turned into a tool of terror and oppression.  
 171. Id.  
 172. OTIS A. SINGLETARY, NEGRO MILITIA AND RECONSTRUCTION 4–5 (1957). 
 173. Id. at 5.  
 174. Id. 
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assert their newly granted independence.”175 And among their most urgent goals 
was to disarm freedmen.176  
Civilian law enforcement―to the extent it existed apart from the militia177―was 
no better. The history of early Reconstruction law enforcement is a history of 
incompetence, corruption, and death. Southern cities exploded in racial violence no 
less than three times in 1866 alone. And, in a scene repeated for over a century, 
often the precipitating event was the violent encounter between a white police 
officer and a black citizen.178 The port city of Norfolk, Virginia, erupted in April 
1866 after a policeman fired on a group of blacks assembled to celebrate 
Congress’s passage of the Civil Rights Act.179 A band of blacks estimated to be 
between two hundred and a thousand strong, some armed, assembled in the rain 
and endured a hail of jeers and bottles from white onlookers as they moved through 
the streets in celebration.180 As the assembly reached a speaker’s stand, a policeman 
cursed them and shot a youth.181 In the ensuing riot, one of the white rioters and his 
mother were killed.182 That night, “roving bands of whites, including police and 
firemen,” coursed through the city, vowing revenge.183 Only the force of the United 
States Army turned them back.184 
Less than a month later, a riot consumed Memphis, Tennessee. Again, 
confrontations between black citizens and white officers sparked the violence. 
Memphis was already prone to thuggish behavior and lawlessness, with shots fired 
throughout the night and heavily armed youth roaming the streets.185 City efforts to 
outlaw slingshots and brass knuckles, as well as coordinate sweeps of the town for 
publicly armed civilians, did not help restore order.186 The local police force, 
dominated by Irish immigrants, was regarded as corrupt and inept.187 Their vice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. Rable notes that the freedmen were disarmed of even the most useless antique 
firearms. RABLE, supra note 166, at 27. 
 177. The distinction was not always clear; state police forces and state militia forces 
could at times be identical. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3039 & n.20 
(2010) (identifying state militia, police, and private actors as sources of freedmen 
repression). 
 178. RABLE, supra note 166, at 33 (noting that riots in the Reconstruction South became 
“the prototype for twentieth century race riots”).  
 179. Id. at 31.  
 180. Id.  
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. For a discussion of the role of the United States Army in these events, see 
ROBERT W. COAKLEY, THE ROLE OF FEDERAL MILITARY FORCES IN DOMESTIC DISORDERS, 
1789–1878, at 273–74 (1988).  
 185. RABLE, supra note 166, at 33.  
 186. Id. at 34–35. Compare this attitude with Miller, supra note 11, at 1345–48 
(discussing the ambivalent nineteenth-century attitudes towards the public carrying of 
weapons).  
 187. RABLE, supra note 166, at 35. The chief of police admitted that he did not have any 
written regulations for police conduct, and that the force was not in fact entirely under his 
control. See H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 326 (1866).  
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frequently targeted the swelling black population of Memphis.188 Of particular 
irritation was the presence of black Union troops.189 One witness testified that 
“[w]hen the police arrested a colored man they were generally very brutal towards 
him.”190 The witness had personally “seen one or two arrested for the slightest 
offence, and instead of taking the man quietly to the lock-up . . . I have seen [the 
police] beat him senseless and throw him into a cart.”191 Police routinely beat or 
indiscriminately shot black citizens who fled or resisted arrest.192 
The majority acquiesced to this brutality.193 Worse, local papers frequently 
fanned the flames of racial grievance and suspicion.194 The previous fall, the media 
had “made the citizens believe that the negroes were all going to rise before 
Christmas” and had advised the citizens that, should the riot begin, they should 
“clean [the negroes] out.”195 The local papers “were constantly stirring up the 
people in this way.”196  
On May 1, 1866, a mix of demobilized black Union soldiers and other blacks 
drinking on Memphis’s South Street interfered in an altercation between two horse-
team drivers, one white and one black.197 When the local police arrived, black 
soldiers turned them away with gunfire and killed one of the officers.198 The police 
returned that night in larger numbers and with a whites-only posse comitatus in 
tow.199 By the evening, what started out as a police action had degenerated into a 
pogrom.200 For the next two days Memphis police and white civilians went on a 
rampage. In the words of the congressional investigating committee: “The 
proportions of what is called the ‘riot,’ but in reality the massacre, proved to be far 
more extended . . . than the committee had any conception of before they entered 
upon their investigation.”201 Whole families saw their homes burned to the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. RABLE, supra note 166, at 35–36.  
 189. Id. There is some evidence that some of these troops did engage in petty larceny and 
other crimes. Id.  
 190. H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 156. 
 191. Id. 
 192. RABLE, supra note 166, at 36.  
 193. Id. (“The public showed little inclination to prosecute the policemen . . . especially 
in cases of brutality against blacks.”). 
 194. The managing editor for the Memphis Daily Argus published a piece in April 1866 
stating, “‘Would to God, they (meaning the negroes) were back in Africa, hell, or some other 
sea-port town, anywhere but here.’” H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 328 (emphasis and 
parenthetical in original). The managing editor denied having published this opinion piece 
knowingly. Id.; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 262 (1988).  
 195. H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 158.  
 196. Id.; see also RABLE, supra note 166, at 37 (noting that the conservative press often 
denounced the presence of black troops in highly charged language).  
 197. RABLE, supra note 166, at 38.  
 198. Id. 
 199. COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 276; RABLE, supra note 166, at 38. 
 200. COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 276 (stating that the white police and sheriff’s posse 
engaged in “what may best be described as a pogrom against blacks generally”).  
 201. H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 5. 
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ground;202 a laborer coming home with groceries was shot by police in the gutter;203 
a cobbler was robbed of his entire savings by a group of men that included several 
armed policemen, who broke into his house searching for arms;204 policemen and 
their accomplices raped black women at gunpoint.205 The duly elected city recorder 
urged his white fellows to arm themselves and “kill[] every God-damned 
nigger.”206 As an incentive, he promised not to fine anyone who carried a concealed 
weapon during the riot.207 After the savagery had ended, forty-six blacks and two 
whites lay dead; five black women had been raped; and ninety-one homes, four 
churches, and twelve schoolhouses burned.208 The congressional investigators 
castigated the fact that these atrocities were “led on by sworn officers of the law 
composing the city government” and that the mob had found itself “under the 
protection and guidance of official authority.”209 
In midsummer of that same year, New Orleans’s police conducted their own 
outrage. This time, however, the violence against African Americans was married 
with specific political opposition to pro-Unionist policies and a perceived 
usurpation of the political process by Republican factions.210 In sum, the local 
police participated in an antigovernment political uprising as much as a race riot.211  
Tensions began to rise during the spring of 1866, after New Orleans residents 
elected conservative former Confederate John T. Monroe as mayor.212 Among his 
first official acts was to appoint a new police chief213 and to purge the New Orleans 
police force of pro-Union officers.214 Estimates of former Confederates in the 
police ranks ranged from two-thirds to four-fifths.215 Armed bands began to roam 
the streets.216 The New Orleans police used vagrancy laws as pretexts to harass and 
arrest blacks.217  
What sparked the riot, however, was not an archetypical encounter between 
black citizens and police. Instead, New Orleans erupted as a result of pro-Union 
attempts to reconvene a constitutional convention to allow black suffrage, 
disenfranchise rebels, and create a new state government.218 Conservatives and 
                                                                                                                 
 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 9. 
 204. Id. at 10. 
 205. Id. at 13–14.  
 206. Id. at 24.  
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. at 36. 
 209. Id. at 5. 
 210. RABLE, supra note 166, at 43.  
 211. See FONER, supra note 194, at 262 (noting that the New Orleans riot “arose directly 
from Reconstruction politics”); RABLE, supra note 166, at 43. 
 212. RABLE, supra note 166, at 44.  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 45 (“Even conservative sources indicated that Monroe had been quick to 
dismiss Union men from the force and fill the department with Confederate veterans.”).  
 215. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-68, at 72, 277 (1867). 
 216. RABLE, supra note 166, at 44. 
 217. Id. at 45. 
 218. FONER, supra note 194, at 263; RABLE, supra note 166, at 45. The history as to why 
the convention had to be reconvened, as opposed to called directly, as well as the strange 
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former Confederates bitterly denounced the convention as an unconstitutional 
Republican power-grab.219 The mayor threatened to arrest the convention-goers as 
disturbers of the peace.220 A local ex-Confederate judge issued grand jury charges 
prior to the riot, calling the convention organizers criminals,221 perjurers,222 and 
persons who “boldly assert they are to receive the aid of arms of the United States 
to assist them in usurping the right to alter the fundamental law of the State of 
Louisiana.”223  
On July 30, twenty-six convention delegates―less than a quorum―assembled 
at the Mechanics’ Institute for opening prayer.224 Sometime between noon and one, 
approximately one hundred black supporters, some armed, marched behind an 
American flag towards the Mechanics’ Institute in support of the convention.225 
Well-armed whites and former Confederates met them around Canal Street, and the 
first shots were fired.226 
The black marchers fled towards the Mechanics’ Institute and barricaded 
themselves, along with the delegates, inside.227 Uniformed New Orleans police 
officers arrived and encircled the building, with plainclothes officers and ex-
Confederates forming an outer ring.228 Uniformed police stormed the building with 
the mob in tow, firing at the trapped delegates and their supporters.229 Any 
distinction between the mob and the police dissolved in the melee.230 Desperate 
men jumped from second- or third-story windows, only to be shot and hacked to 
death by police and rioters below.231 Congressional investigators pulled no 
punches; the riot was a “work of massacre . . . pursued with a cowardly ferocity 
unsurpassed in the annals of crime.”232 Although conservatives claimed that the 
entire event was planned by Republicans in Washington, D.C. to discredit them,233 
“the coordinated actions of the police and mob lent some credence to the charge 
                                                                                                                 
alliances that it produced are as Byzantine as any in Louisiana politics. For a discussion, see 
RABLE, supra note 166, at 46–58.  
 219. RABLE, supra note 166, at 47. 
 220. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-68, at 85; RABLE, supra note 166, at 49.  
 221. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-68, at 73–74. 
 222. Id.  
 223. Id. at 74.  
 224. FONER, supra note 194, at 263; RABLE, supra note 166, at 51.  
 225. COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 283; RABLE, supra note 166, at 51.  
 226. COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 284; RABLE, supra note 166, at 52. It is unclear who 
fired first, a problem that tends to frustrate theories of the Second Amendment that include a 
right for people to assemble armed under the theory of defense of self or of others. See 
Miller, supra note 11, at 1334–35 (“Whatever Reconstruction lawmakers thought about the 
Second Amendment, they did not understand it to facilitate a guerilla campaign between 
southern factions, resolved solely by ex post litigation over who had shot first.”).  
 227. COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 284; RABLE, supra note 166, at 52.  
 228. COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 284.  
 229. Id. 
 230. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-68, at 74 (1867); id. at 40 (“[T]he police appeared to be under no 
control . . . but acted as with the mob.”); RABLE, supra note 166, at 52. 
 231. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-68, at 40; COAKLEY, supra note 184, at 284; RABLE, supra note 
166, at 53. 
 232. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-68, at 40. 
 233. RABLE, supra note 166, at 56–58. 
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that the New Orleans riot was a preconcerted plot to massacre Union men and 
blacks.”234 
Prior to McDonald, most of the Second Amendment literature paid scant 
attention to these specific instances of police repression.235 McDonald made 
African American self-defense against private and public threats during 
Reconstruction the centerpiece of its holding that the Second Amendment is 
incorporated against the states. These outrages seem to bolster the conclusion that 
Reconstruction Congress and Reconstruction America were firmly behind a right 
for freedmen to arm themselves to deter and, if necessary, resist the depredations of 
the police.  
Stephen Halbrook, who has written extensively on Reconstruction-era attitudes, 
argues that Republican sentiment, and the Fourteenth Amendment, “championed 
the right of freedmen to keep arms in opposition to searches and seizures of arms 
by state militias.”236 Indeed, when it came down to local law enforcement and the 
right to bear arms, Halbrook states that Congress was willing to completely disband 
state militias “to protect freedmen from deprivation of this right [to armed self-
defense].”237 David Kopel has summarized congressional attitudes towards self-
defense in the run-up to the Fourteenth Amendment as “plainly a concern about the 
self-defense rights of individual citizens, especially freedmen.”238 Kopel goes on to 
argue that “[i]t would be ludicrous to attempt to explain the record of the 
Reconstruction Congresses as anything but strong support for a personal right to 
arms for self-defense.”239 McDonald seems to confirm this understanding of 
Reconstruction history. The right to keep and bear arms is fundamental, and we 
know this because Congress and Reconstruction Americans expected the freedmen 
to have arms to defend themselves against lawless local government.240 To 
paraphrase Kopel, America’s understanding at Reconstruction, if not earlier, was 
that acts of self-defense against a lone criminal, a lone criminal officer, or a platoon 
of criminal law enforcement officials are simply variations on the same theme of 
self-defense.241  
                                                                                                                 
 
 234. Id. at 52.  
 235. As of September 4, 2010, a search in the Westlaw Journals and Periodicals database 
for “Second Amendment” and then “riot” within two words of “Memphis,” “Norfolk,” or 
“New Orleans” returned only five hits.  
 236. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, FREEDMEN, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE RIGHT 
TO BEAR ARMS, 1866–1876, at 69 (1998).  
 237. Id. at 115. McDonald wholly embraced this point. See McDonald v. City of 
Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3041 n.25, 3043 (2010). 
 238. Kopel, supra note 51, at 1454. Kopel’s view is written mostly in the now settled 
issue of individual versus collective rights; however, the logic of his position would seem to 
support a fairly strong view of the right to self-defense against law enforcement.  
 239. Id.  
 240. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3042, 3044.  
 241. Kopel, supra note 51, at 1454 n.358.  
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IV. RETAIL REBELLION AND RETAIL JUSTICE 
We do not need citizen avengers who are authorized to respond to 
unlawful police conduct by gunning down the offending officers.242 
So, when, if ever, is there a constitutional right to kill a cop? Well, there is a 
right, but it is not implemented in the broad and preemptive sense that some 
champions of the Second Amendment may think and certainly not in the manner in 
which most other constitutional rights are vindicated. Instead, just as rebellion can 
be delivered retail, so can constitutional justice. The problem of retail rebellion has 
a retail solution.  
As discussed, originalist methodology potentially commits the Court to an 
outcome that is both logically consistent and practically unsavory. The Court’s 
originalism seems to demand that the 1791 formalism of illegal police action and 
the 1868 object of protecting freedmen overwhelm whatever rules of modern law 
enforcement have developed within the last half-century. In both cases, the Second 
Amendment becomes a license for anarchy: The people have a right to bear arms, 
in public, specifically to intimidate the police, and to use those weapons against the 
police in circumstances in which they perceive their constitutional rights or the 
constitutional rights of others to have been violated, subject only to post-
confrontation resolution by a court. But this undermines the entire philosophy 
behind almost every state law that bans arms in government buildings, that requires 
persons to surrender arms while in custody, and that punishes resistance to even an 
illegal arrest. It also calls into question the underpinning of the Court’s entire 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, beginning with Terry v. Ohio,243 that the safety 
of law enforcement officials justifies restrictions on liberty.244  
Certainly, the Court could decide that retail rebellion is not a problem at all. It 
could simply hold that Second Amendment self-defense is no respecter of persons, 
and unlawful confrontation is the same whether the assailant flashes a badge and a 
gun, or just a gun. But it is unlikely the Court would sacrifice half a century of 
police-protective doctrine on the altar of Second Amendment absolutism.245 
Alternatively, the Court could solve the problem of retail rebellion by judicial fiat. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 242. United States v. Johnson, 542 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1976).  
 243. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 244. For some work on the consequences of Heller and McDonald on police enforcement 
and Fourth Amendment protection, see George M. Dery III, Unintended Consequences: The 
Supreme Court’s Interpretation of the Second Amendment in District of Columbia v. Heller 
Could Water-Down Fourth Amendment Rights, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 1 (2009) 
(discussing the effect of strong Second Amendment rights on Fourth Amendment 
protections); Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which 
Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun-Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 
85, 88–89 (2010), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/ 
2010/24/LRColl2010n24Rosenthal&Malcom.pdf (discussing cases in light of ability of law 
enforcement to conduct a stop-and-frisk).  
 245. McDonald is a case in point. Despite decades of originalist disapproval of selective 
incorporation, a plurality of the McDonald Court flinched when it came to driving a stake in 
the heart of this method of incorporation. See, e.g., McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3030–31 
(declining to revisit whether incorporation through the due process clause is appropriate).  
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It could simply add to its expanding list of ipse dixit that the Second Amendment 
does not cover prohibitions on resisting arrest. But then the Court begins to look 
less like a government body whose power is reason and more like a government 
body whose power is power. Alternatively, the Court could designate resisting 
arrest as an exercise of the Second Amendment subject to some low level of 
scrutiny. But both Heller and McDonald indicate strongly that standards of scrutiny 
are just shorthand for unguided interest balancing.246 The balancing is supposed to 
have been accomplished in the very enactment of the right. None are ideal 
solutions. And the last two alternatives expose the Heller majority to accusations—
seemingly underscored by McDonald247—that its methodology is instrumental, and 
that originalism is simply a historical rouge applied to a base policy preference.  
An alternative way out of the mire, which I advance in this Part, is to 
acknowledge the complexity of history, and to conclude that the right to self-
defense against police officers is a codified natural right, but a very thin one.248 The 
right to self-defense against government does not include a right to publicly arm 
oneself in order to thwart police misconduct in general; neither does it include a 
right to publicly arm oneself in anticipation of a confrontation with a rogue police 
officer; neither does it include a right sufficient to sustain a facial challenge if a 
state or municipality has gone to the absurd length as to abolish self-help against 
police altogether. Instead, the Second Amendment right to retail rebellion is 
directly tied to the ephemera of circumstance:249 it preserves a right to present to an 
impartial jury the circumstances under which an individual defendant believed it 
necessary to exercise a natural right to self-preservation against a police officer in 
an individual case.250  
I do not mean to suggest that this thin conception of Second Amendment self-
defense is a ceiling—far from it. It is a floor. States, exercising their judgment, and 
within the bounds of equal protection and due process, have as much power as they 
wish to extend the right, whether through affirmative legislation or through 
interpretation of their own constitutions. They may allow for reasonable (or 
perhaps even unreasonable) use of force in resistance to law enforcement; they may 
allow concealed or unconcealed arms anywhere subject to their control, even into 
                                                                                                                 
 
 246. Id. at 3047 (expressly rejecting interest balancing); District of Columbia v. Heller, 
554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (same).  
 247. See supra note 245.  
 248. The reason for the distinction between public arms and private arms is explored in 
my previous work. See generally Miller, supra note 11.  
 249. See Brannon P. Denning, In Defense of a “Thin” Second Amendment: Culture, the 
Constitution, and the Gun Control Debate, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 419, 419 (2008). Of 
course, my proposal has the Second Amendment working at a much thinner level than 
Professor Denning has proposed; however, it does so with even more of a feeling that the 
history does not support a thick Second Amendment.  
 250. I reserve for others the more difficult issue of whether this restriction applies to 
resisting arrest in one’s home or residence. There is some support for special protection 
against illegal arrest in the home as opposed to outside the home. See Sapen v. State, 869 
N.E.2d 1273, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (“We have recognized that a greater privilege exists 
to resist an unlawful entry into private premises than to resist an unlawful arrest in a public 
place.” (citing Adkisson v. State, 728 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000))); Casselman v. 
State, 472 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985) (same).  
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the police precinct. Perhaps a state could even abolish its police force altogether 
and rely solely on citizen militias to enforce the law. But these are rights that derive 
from state legislation or state constitutions. They are not imposed by federal 
judicial interpretation of the Second Amendment.  
This thin conception of self-defense against the police incorporates the 
complexity of history, without abandoning its guidance altogether. It preserves 
local discretion to adjust an optimal balance between policing by individual 
community members and policing by a professional force. It keeps the private 
ownership of firearms intact as a latent, but not an active, threat to government. 
Plus, it best marries the right of self-defense with the existing doctrinal structures 
that address fact-intensive constitutional challenges. 
A. Retail Justice and Historical Uncertainty 
The Court must get serious about the complexity of Reconstruction if its 
analysis is going to amount to anything more than a collection of carefully selected 
historical citations.251 Heller is glib about Reconstruction’s effect on the Second 
Amendment and the right to self-defense. The case acknowledges that Southern 
governments immediately after the Civil War attempted to disarm the freedmen and 
that the freedmen needed such arms for their protection.252 It acknowledges that the 
Reconstruction theories of self-defense were shaped specifically by these state-
sponsored atrocities.253 McDonald is a vast improvement. It recognizes that Second 
Amendment values during the nineteenth century were shaped largely by the 
violence of Reconstruction.254 It also acknowledges that the contours of the Second 
Amendment were delineated by the need to protect freedmen from terror—both 
official and unofficial. 
But both Heller and McDonald still fail to fully engage with the interpretive 
problems of Reconstruction history. And these problems are profound. First, for 
every historical instance of a freedman fighting to defend his rights against an ex-
Confederate police officer, there is an ex-Confederate who claimed that it was his 
rights that were under assault by the Union army and pro-Union militia. Indeed, 
whites-only citizen militias, whites-only rifle clubs, and whites-only paramilitary 
organizations consistently justified their existence on the belief that they had a right 
to defend themselves against the threat of overbearing pro-Union law enforcement 
and corrupt Republican governments.255 Conservatives in the South simply would 
not acquiesce to the legitimacy of Reconstruction governments or law 
                                                                                                                 
 
 251. See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun 
Control, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, at 32, 35 (calling this collection a “snow job[]”).  
 252. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 615–16 (2008).  
 253. Id. 
 254. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3038–40 (2010). 
 255. A Klan uprising in South Carolina was sparked by professed fear that the 
Republican government was arming a “select militia” of loyal, mostly black, troops against 
the white South Carolina citizenry. PROCEEDINGS IN THE KU KLUX TRIALS AT COLUMBIA, S.C. 
IN THE UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURT, NOVEMBER TERM 1871, at 425 (Benn Pitman & 
Louis Freeland Post eds., 1872); see also Miller, supra note 11, at 1332–33 (discussing 
implications of this history). 
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enforcement.256 To them, the danger was not from the activity of the Klan, but 
“from [pro-Union] state militias.”257 When Texas formed a militia, officially called 
the Texas State Police, violence erupted so often that the state government had to 
declare martial law.258 The widespread refusal of Southerners to accept “the 
authority, much less the sovereignty, of the new state administrations seemed to 
reduce southern society to a Hobbesian state of nature.”259 And yet, the existing 
scholarship, and certainly Heller and McDonald, provide no answers to the 
question of whether men who armed themselves in opposition to pro-Union police 
had a Second Amendment right to do so. And, if not, why not. 
Second, the Court continues to ignore the reality that Reconstruction Americans 
were not wholly unbiased in their attitudes to self-defense. Reconstruction 
Americans wanted to arm pro-Union forces against anti-Union police and 
paramilitary organizations. They were not so interested in protecting the rights of 
anti-Union and anti-freedmen organizations to arm themselves against pro-Union 
law enforcement.260 Bills that swept too broadly to disarm individuals were not 
necessarily wrong because they took away a constitutional right for citizens to 
publicly bear arms.261 Instead, a broad-based resolution to take arms away crippled 
the ability of loyal Southerners to organize and “put down these rebel 
organizations.”262 In fact, one senator said that he “should be very willing to favor 
discriminating legislation that would regulate the use of arms by the militia in the 
South.”263 Another senator remarked that all the rebels should have been disarmed, 
even if the government “had to search every habitation in all the southern 
States.”264 Newspapers viewed Southerners’ claims that they needed to protect 
                                                                                                                 
 
 256. For just one example, see the remarks of a colonel in Kentucky reporting on 
freedmen’s affairs: “[I]t has been found impossible to make arrests. This is not strange in a 
country where hostility to the government is a rule; where they fortify their still-houses, defy 
revenue officers, and disarm and drive the United States deputy marshals from the country.” 
H.R. DOC. NO. 40-329, at 11 (1868).  
 257. RABLE, supra note 166, at 72.  
 258. Id. at 105. 
 259. Id. at 63. In fairness, some local authorities believed that the right to bear arms 
trumped even efforts to maintain civilian control. Governor Scott of South Carolina believed 
that it was a constitutional right to carry arms, even if it meant, in the words of George 
Rable, “brandishing shotguns and rifles at political rallies.” Id. at 72. Compare with law 
makers who forbade assemblages with arms. SINGLETARY, supra note 172, at 21 (noting a 
South Carolina decree that criminalized the drilling or parading with arms, except by the 
militia).  
 260. Except, perhaps, in the limited sense of allowing all individuals firearms in their 
homes. Cf. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3041 n.25 (2008); see also 
Miller, supra note 11, at 1334–35.  
 261. This is the conclusion that Halbrook appears to make. See HALBROOK, supra note 
236, at 69.  
 262. CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 2D SESS. 1849 (1867) (remarks of Sen. Waitman T. 
Willey).  
 263. Id. (emphasis added). In response to the Memphis riots, for example, a witness 
claimed that military policy would have been to surround the armed mob and disarm them. 
See H.R. REP. NO. 39-101, at 230 (1866).  
 264. CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 2D SESS. 2744 (1870). 
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themselves from freedmen or pro-Union forces as pretexts for anarchy and 
crime.265 
The existing scholarship provides few answers to these interpretive problems. 
That Congress wanted the people to extend the right of self-defense to freedmen is 
difficult to dispute. Scholars such as Diamond, Cottrol, Kates, Kopel, Halbrook, 
and others have persuasively made the case that freedmen self-defense was an 
animating issue in the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment.266 And now, with McDonald, arming freedmen is understood, 
correctly, as the foundation for incorporation. But conceding that freedmen had a 
right to arm themselves in defense against police violence gives us little 
information about the details of this right. What exactly did Reconstruction 
America think the freedmen were going to do with the guns once they had them? 
Were they going to form a counter-militia?267 Under what circumstances was a 
freedman pulling a gun on a police officer a victim, as opposed to a criminal? 
Under what circumstances was a police officer effectuating an arrest a usurper, as 
opposed to a public servant? When are the members of the militia champions of 
freedom, and when are they tools of a hostile and repressive government? No 
existing treatment of either the Second Amendment or self-defense adequately 
answers these questions.  
Reconstruction puts public understanding originalism on the horns of a 
dilemma: few adherents of public understanding originalism seriously think 
Reconstruction America understood ex-Confederates to have a Second Amendment 
right to publicly arm themselves to oppose pro-Union law enforcement; and yet, 
neither can it be that only those who support the policies and positions of the 
federal government enjoy a right to arm themselves for self-defense.268 But if we 
anachronistically reject the partisan nature of self-defense during Reconstruction, 
then the consequences seem intolerably anarchic. It means that if America wanted 
the Second Amendment to guarantee the black and pro-Union citizens of Norfolk, 
Memphis, and New Orleans a right to arm themselves, organize, threaten, and, if 
necessary, kill oppressive police officers in 1866, then the same interpretation must 
apply to standoffs in Shreveport, Louisiana today.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 265. See Excusing the Ku-Klux, HARPER’S WKLY., Nov. 25, 1871, at 1098 (noting the 
“pretense [of] regard” for the Constitution from Klan defenders); H.R. REP. NO. 42-41, pt. 1, 
at 100 (1872) (calling these claims a “pretext for crimes and lawlessness” that could “end 
only in anarchy.”).  
 266. See supra notes 236−41 and accompanying text. 
 267. For a discussion of such a history, see MICHAEL W. FITZGERALD, THE UNION 
LEAGUE MOVEMENT IN THE DEEP SOUTH 68–69, 220–33 (1989).  
 268. It does little good to shelter under the fiction that only those citizens who are arming 
themselves to defend the Constitution against aggressors have a Second Amendment right to 
publicly arm themselves and resist law enforcement. This is what David Williams calls 
“conjuring with the People.” David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second 
Amendment Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 879 (1996). These 
were exactly the same arguments that the Klan employed to support their terrorist activities. 
For example, Nathan Bedford Forrest, the progenitor of the Klan, argued that he was 
preserving the “old Constitution” from the activity of Republican radicals and usurpers. See 
“I Intend to Kill the Radicals”: An Interview with N.B. Forrest (1868), reprinted in 
RECONSTRUCTION, 1865–1877, at 90, 92 (Richard N. Current ed., 1965).  
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Where the history is so muddled, the costs of a wrong conclusion so dear, and 
where the political branches are functioning adequately, courts should adopt a 
narrow approach.269 A substantive Second Amendment right to arm oneself 
publicly, to resist arrest, and to kill law enforcement could not have survived the 
frenzy and confusion of Reconstruction intact. Many Reconstruction Americans, 
perhaps the majority, wanted to de-escalate the war of all against all in the South, 
not to inflame it.270  
Instead of a free-floating right to resist the police, it is more likely that the 
people wanted freedmen to have equal access to whatever rights to self-defense 
were in place already.271 This does not mean that history demands the now-rejected 
“equality only” theory of the right to keep and bear arms.272 McDonald can 
accommodate both a theory of equal access to private firearms in public, and a 
substantive right to private firearms in the home.273 So, where the state through its 
constitution or legislature has empowered individuals to publicly carry arms, to 
oppose state authority with arms, or to resist arrest with force, then these rights 
cannot be denied selectively based on race. But there is no substantive federal 
constitutional guarantee that a person be able to publicly carry arms to oppose state 
authority, or to resist arrest with force. There is some Reconstruction evidence to 
support this view. During military reconstruction of the South in 1867, the Fifth 
Military District issued an order that  
no fire-arms will be permitted to be carried either openly or secretly, by 
any person in the city of New Orleans, except such as may be 
authorized or required by law to carry the same, in the execution of 
their official duties. The mayor of the city will give such instructions to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 269. See, e.g., NRA v. City of Chicago, 567 F.3d 856, 860 (7th Cir. 2009) (suggesting 
that scholarship and politics should decide the relationship between guns and crime), rev’d, 
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010); Posner, supra note 251, at 34 (noting that Heller is wrong because it 
shortchanges the importance of local preference and federalism on gun issues); Wilkinson, 
supra note 58, at 264 (noting that where the history is unclear, the modest judge will defer to 
the political branches). 
 270. Halbrook and others seem to conclude that Reconstruction America believed the 
right to bear arms in public―even in the hands of former Confederates―was so sacrosanct 
that the only recourse for Reconstruction governments was to sponsor a counter-force of 
freedmen and pro-Union militias. See HALBROOK, supra note 236, at 68, 76-78, 115 
(discussing rights of Confederates to keep and bear arms and ability of freedmen to form 
private militia groups). It is not impossible to come to this conclusion, but the level of 
certainty seems out of step with the historical record. Reconstruction violence can be viewed 
as an extreme form of the prisoner’s dilemma, in which everyone clamored for arms on the 
real or perceived threat to themselves by others. And “[s]ince a primary purpose of a 
government’s authority is overcoming prisoner’s dilemmas,” there is “no reason to think that 
[public] disarmament is beyond the government’s authority.” Green, supra note 48, at 152.  
 271. See John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1385, 1448–49 (1992). 
 272. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3042–43 (2010) (rejecting the 
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee the right to keep and bear arms 
in the states, but only an equal right to keep and bear arms in the states). 
 273. See Miller, supra note 11, at 1346–50. 
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the police as may be necessary to insure a strict enforcement of this 
order . . . .274  
An African American pastor who witnessed the Norfolk riots testified to 
congressional investigators that he thought that if the authorities were “going to 
disarm the colored people he ought to disarm the whites also.”275  
Hence, the ability to refuse to surrender a firearm when confronted by a law 
enforcement official can be granted by state law, but cannot be denied to a person 
on the grounds of race.276 Similarly, to the extent that a license to carry such a 
firearm is granted, it could become a species of property protected by the Due 
Process Clause which cannot be rescinded without notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. In other words, the Constitution does not require that states permit their 
citizenry to publicly arm themselves in case of a confrontation with the police, nor 
does it prevent the police from disarming publicly armed citizens. But to the extent 
any state decides that it wants to permit its citizens to be publicly armed, that state-
created right cannot be partially administered or arbitrarily abridged.277 
Finally, some special solicitude applies to firearms in the privacy of the home as 
compared to in public.278 It seems fairly clear that both eighteenth-century and 
nineteenth-century Americans believed that a person had a right to keep and bear 
arms in the home for self-defense.279 As I have said, “[i]f the Second Amendment 
right means anything . . . it means that the government has no business telling a 
man he cannot have a gun to protect his home.”280 As can be seen, however, that 
right becomes far more problematic when the question comes to the public bearing 
of arms. Don Kates, considered by many to be a dean of the Second Amendment 
rights movement, said this decades ago (a position he has since modified):281 
                                                                                                                 
 
 274. H.R. DOC. NO. 40-342, at 166 (1868) (Special Order No. 45, Assistant Adjutant 
General George L. Hartsuff). 
 275. H.R. DOC. NO. 39-72, at 38–39 (1867) (testimony of Rev. John M. Brown). 
 276. See Harrison, supra note 271, at 1448–49.  
 277. See Donofrio v. City of New York, No. 04-CV-3336, 2009 WL 6388381, at *3-4 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 24, 2009) (citing, inter alia,  Fla. Retail Fed’n, Inc. v. Att’y Gen. of Fla., 576 
F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288 (N.D. Fla. 2008), and Bates v. City of San Jose, No. C-06-05302, 
2008 WL 2694025, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. July 7, 2008)) (discussing property rights in handgun 
license); Brief of Thirty-Four Professional Historians and Legal Historians as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 24–26, McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) 
(No. 08-1521) (emphasizing that the Fourteenth Amendment passed to prevent disarmament 
of class of citizens, not restrictions on classes of weapons).  
 278. See McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3105 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The State generally has 
a lesser basis for regulating private as compared to public acts, and firearms kept inside the 
home generally pose a lesser threat to public welfare as compared to firearms taken outside.” 
(citing, inter alia, Miller, supra note 11, at 1321–36)).  
 279. See generally Miller, supra note 11.  
 280. Id. at 1301.  
 281. Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 149–50 (1986) [hereinafter Kates, Second Amendment: A Dialogue] (modifying his 
previous views on the public carrying of arms). 
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 Largely as a result of gun-owner organizations’ own legislative 
proposals, the laws of every state but Vermont prohibit at least the 
carrying of a concealed handgun off one’s own premises. A common 
proposal, already the law in many jurisdictions, is to prohibit even the 
open carrying of handguns (or all firearms), with limited exceptions for 
target shooting and the like, without a permit. . . .  
 The constitutionality of such legislation under the amendment can 
be established on the same basis as the unconstitutionality of a ban on 
possession.282 
Mr. Kates was too quick to relent. Using the home as the demarcation for the 
Second Amendment right, just as it is in the First, Third, and Fourth Amendments, 
would hardly be a radical or even a novel proposal.283 If not implicit in the very 
concept of the right at the Founding, the turmoil of the Civil War and 
Reconstruction made it so.  
Finally, this method of resolving incompatible natural law claims is a staple 
feature of American jurisprudence.284 Natural law arguments tend to be 
                                                                                                                 
 
 282. Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the Second 
Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 267 (1983). Kates goes on to say:  
research in seventeenth and eighteenth-century colonial statutes indicates that, 
while the statutes used “keep” to refer to a person’s having a gun in his home, 
they used “bear” only to refer to the bearing of arms while engaged in militia 
activities. Thus the amendment’s language was apparently intended to protect 
the possession of firearms for all legitimate purposes, but to guarantee the right 
to carry them outside the home only in the course of militia service. Outside 
that context the only carrying of firearms which the amendment appears to 
protect is such transportation as is implicit in the concept of a right to possess—
e.g., transporting them between the purchaser or owner’s premises and a 
shooting range, or a gun store or gunsmith and so on.  
Id. at 267. But see Kates, Second Amendment: A Dialogue, supra note 281, at 149–50 
(modifying this view). Although one could read Heller to suggest that reading “keep” and 
“bear” differently depending on public versus private keeping or carrying is an odd “hybrid” 
or “middle” position, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582–87 (2008), it is 
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differences between private arms bearing and public arms bearing, between personal 
protection and collective protection.  
 283. David Kopel used the analogy of private sex acts to discuss the scope of the Second 
Amendment right. See Kopel, supra note 51, at 1532 n.724 (“A rule designed to protect 
people’s sensibilities in public spaces should not be applied to the mere possession of a 
weapon on private property. . . . Certain members of the public may be personally offended 
by the knowledge that someone else may be in private possession of a machine gun, just as 
other members of the public may be offended that someone may be engaged in a particular 
type of sex act.”). Professor Volokh appears to consider my elaboration of this analogy to be 
nonsensical. Eugene Volokh, The First and Second Amendments, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
SIDEBAR 97 (2009), http://www.columbialawreview.org/Sidebar/volume/109/97_Volokh.pdf 
(responding to Miller, supra note 11).  
 284. Cf. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: 
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 271 (1992) (“[I]n American history natural rights has 
equally served both abolitionists and the defenders of the right of ownership in human . . . 
property.”).  
974 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:939 
 
conversation stoppers.285 In the case of Civil War and Reconstruction particularly, 
natural rights talk about the right to be free versus the right to hold human property 
easily transmuted into natural rights talk about the right to be free from the threat of 
Klan violence versus the right to be free from the threat of freedmen vengeance.286 
The history of American law has been to channel contested natural rights claims 
into debates over process, equality, and distinctions between public and private 
space.287 Resolving the contested issue of a natural right to self-defense by 
reference to due process, equality, or the scope of privacy fits within this 
tradition.288  
B. Retail Justice and Doctrinal Consistency 
But what of the extreme case: the person who encounters a rogue police officer 
and the choice is to kill or be killed? One could argue that the Second Amendment 
requires the states to make exceptions for that scenario. Therefore, any law that 
refuses to make such an exception must be facially invalid because there may arise 
a scenario in which a person must use force in order to resist the excessive force of 
a police officer. While such a rigid rule barring self-defense even against excessive 
force is foolish in the extreme, facial invalidity of such a rule is not necessarily 
required. Instead, the Second Amendment requires simply that any claim and 
evidence of self-defense in opposition to police be presented to the jury. The 
doctrinal structure to implement this right is already in place.  
First, there is rarely a facial challenge to statutes that cover specific fact-
intensive scenarios. The Fourth Amendment is a good example. An 
unconstitutional search and seizure is seldom adjudicated ex ante. “The Supreme 
Court . . . strongly disfavor[s] facial challenges in the Fourth Amendment 
context.”289 Similarly, the necessity to use self-defense, even deadly self-defense 
against a police officer, cannot typically be adjudicated ex ante.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 285. See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 14 (1991) (“Our rights talk, in its absoluteness, promotes unrealistic 
expectations, heightens social conflict, and inhibits dialogue that might lead toward 
consensus . . . .”); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Corporate Decisionmaking and the Moral Rights 
of Employees: Participatory Management and Natural Law, 43 VILL. L. REV. 741, 745 
(1998) (observing generally that “[u]sing rights-based terminology to phrase the [legal] 
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Oman, Specific Performance and the Thirteenth Amendment, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2020, 2030 
(2009) (referring to constitutional arguments as conversation stoppers).  
 286. As Harrison observed, “[e]veryone knows that the rhetoric of the Reconstruction era 
mixed references to equality and to natural rights.” Harrison, supra note 271, at 1468. For a 
discussion of this problem, see Miller, supra note 11, at 1332–36, 1346–49.  
 287. For an explication of this phenomenon, see HORWITZ, supra note 284, at 194, 206–
08, 253–57.  
 288. Green suggests that one approach to the Second Amendment may be that 
“[c]itizens . . . retained some of the natural right to bear arms, provided it was carefully 
circumscribed to avoid too many of the inconveniences of the state of nature.” Green, supra 
note 48, at 161.  
 289. Orin S. Kerr, Congress, the Courts, and New Technologies: A Response to Professor 
Solove, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 779, 788 (2005).  
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Second, the Court has already adopted stringent procedural barriers to enforcing 
constitutional norms that may arise only in specific case-by-case scenarios. These 
procedural barriers would seem to limit any broad or prospective protection of a 
right to resist law enforcement. Two cases dealing with prospective relief from 
potentially excessive force are particularly apt. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons290 
concerned the constitutional standing of a citizen who sought to enjoin the use of 
“chokeholds” by the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD).291 The facts were 
uncontroverted. In the early morning of October 6, 1976, two LAPD officers pulled 
over Adolph Lyons, a young black resident of the city, for a broken taillight.292 
Within five to ten seconds, and completely unprovoked, one of the officers “began 
to choke Lyons by applying a forearm against his throat.”293 Even though he was 
cuffed, the police continued to choke Lyons until he lost all bladder and bowel 
control and blacked out.294 After he came to, the officers issued a traffic citation 
and released him.295  
Lyons was not the only individual to have suffered this treatment; no less than 
sixteen individuals had died from this hold.296 Lyons sought relief for himself and 
all others similarly situated, including an injunction that no police should use the 
hold except where the target of the hold is “threatening the immediate use of deadly 
force.”297 He also sought a declaration that “use of the chokeholds absent the threat 
of immediate use of deadly force is a per se violation” of the subject’s 
constitutional rights.298 The majority held that Lyons had no standing to sue for 
such prospective relief.299 The risk that Lyons would encounter another police 
officer who would “illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any 
provocation” or resistance on his part was so speculative and remote that it failed to 
amount to a real “case or controversy” that the Court could adjudicate.300 To show 
an actual controversy, not only would Lyons have had to allege that he will 
encounter the police again, but also “make the incredible assertion either (1) that all 
police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to 
have an encounter . . . or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to 
act in such a manner.”301 The Court could not agree that the “odds” of Lyons’s 
encountering another police officer and subsequently suffering unconstitutionally 
excessive force rose beyond the level of “conjecture.”302 
                                                                                                                 
 
 290. 461 U.S. 95 (1983).  
 291. Id. at 95–96.  
 292. Id. at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
 293. Id. at 115.  
 294. Id.  
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 297. Id. at 98 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting complaint).  
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 299. Id. at 111–13. 
 300. Id. at 105.  
 301. Id. at 105–06 (emphasis in original). 
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Ashcroft v. Mattis303 is also illuminating. In Mattis, a father of an eighteen-year-
old boy who was shot while fleeing the police sued for a declaration that Missouri’s 
statute allowing deadly force in apprehending felons was unconstitutional.304 The 
father amended the complaint and alleged that an injunction was necessary to 
protect his other son who, “if ever arrested . . . on suspicion of a felony, might flee 
or give the appearance of fleeing, and would therefore be in danger of being killed 
by these defendants or other police officers.”305 Again, the Court concluded that 
this allegation was so speculative that it could not be considered a live case or 
controversy.306  
Finally, to the extent legislatures or state judges make poor judgments about the 
legality of self-defense against the police, the Constitution does provide a refuge—
the jury. The jury is designed to serve as a check on other branches of government, 
including the judiciary. The jury box is the one place where natural law meets 
positive law.307 Although there may be no affirmative constitutional requirement 
for there to be a self-defense exception written into the organic law of a state, the 
self-defense exception cannot be denied to a citizen tried for saving his life from a 
lawless police officer. The natural right to self-preservation can never be 
sequestered from the jury.  
A plurality of the Court agrees. In Montana v. Egelhoff,308 Justice Scalia, writing 
for a four-member plurality, suggested in dicta that the historical record may 
support the conclusion “that the right to have a jury consider self-defense 
evidence . . . is fundamental.”309 In Egelhoff, the Court addressed a Montana statute 
that stated that voluntary intoxication was legally irrelevant in determining the 
existence of the requisite mens rea for a crime.310 After a night of heavy drinking, 
James Egelhoff was found shouting obscenities in the back seat of a station 
wagon.311 In the front seat were the bodies of his two drinking companions and a 
freshly used .38 caliber handgun.312 At issue was whether the common law defense 
of intoxication was “so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to 
be ranked fundamental.”313 The Court, in a plurality decision written by Justice 
Scalia, held that the intoxication defense was not fundamental.314 But the Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
 303. 431 U.S. 171 (1977).  
 304. Id.  
 305. Id. at 172 n.2 (emphasis omitted).  
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speculated in its decision that self-defense may be so fundamental that it cannot be 
kept from the jury.315  
These doctrinal solutions to addressing the problem of federal supervision over 
policing seem ready-made to address the problem of retail rebellion―even after 
Heller and McDonald.  
CONCLUSION 
Odds are the Court will leave self-defense against the police largely where the 
Justices found it.316 The question is why. The pragmatic solution to retail rebellion 
is apparent, but the principled solution is not. It may be that Heller simply “is 
another example of the Court’s tendency to constitutionalize the national consensus 
on certain hot button issues and then enforce it against outliers.”317  
But a methodology that must be abandoned as soon as its logic leads to 
politically unpalatable results raises questions about the soundness of the 
methodology in the first place. Several years ago, after another case with Second 
Amendment overtones, United States v. Lopez,318 scholars asked, “what if the 
Supreme Court held a constitutional revolution and nobody came?”319 The same 
thing could be happening to Heller.  
Doubtless the people will continue to buy Heller’s brand of originalism for 
many years to come,320 and people will celebrate the correctness of its conclusions 
and the soundness of its reasoning. And yet, one must ask whether they are buying 
a theory whose shelf life has already expired.  
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